The reign of Pope Boniface VIII is a tapestry of papal agendas fashioned for the creation of empire under the guise of the Holy Roman Church. His papacy materializes as kingship rather than pure Apostolic See. The papacy is a relic of the spiritual body. Empire is the incarnation of the secular body. The disparity between the two- spiritual and secular- forms the crux of the matter.[1] His method: war.

The times of Boniface saw the death knell to any form of civil interaction between the once united Parte Guelfa (“Guelfs”) which disintegrated into factions holding the popular names of White Guelfs and Black Guelfs. The political turbulence was in a chaotic phase that moved like wildfire through the comune of Florence and surrounding city-states. Although the pope made attempts to heal these gaping wounds he was unable to bring to the fore his temporal power and apostolic authority to reconcile broken families and divided cities. Even though Pope Boniface was hailed as the vicar of Christ the politics surrounding his apostolic authority did not always yield to his will. Eventually, the political strain ended in his demise. In his effort to expand the power of the pontifical office and papal state Boniface sought a much stronger temporal power most distinctively heralded in his comment that “I am Caesar—I am Emperor.”[2] 

Bruni chronicles the early conflict of the Guelf and Ghibelline factions noting that there were those whose favor went to the popes while others favored the emperors. Later, Boniface was visited by a large entourage of barons and wrote a letter regarding Giano della Bella which altered the course of the conflict. Boniface was the first to reintroduce the celebration of Jubilee in 1300 and struck a mercenary deal with Jean de Chalon of Champagne France. One of the most telling statements of the work of Pope Boniface is Compagni’s conclusion that the pope ruled the church as he saw fit even amid nascent evil and peace accords. There were times when subjects implored Boniface to change his mind to mend the Florentine situation. And he did. Then, later he was persuaded to break the power of the Florentines.

Men harbored great fear of the pope due substantially to the harsh charges he levied against them accompanied with his henchmen who rode into the comune full of war-like vigor. Mercenaries executed his will becoming ambassadors of the pope’s words. His lucid points of view are openly displayed when he commented, “I do not want to lose men to weak women”[3] and he responded to Charles saying he had “put him in the foundation of gold.”[4] Boniface reminds men to be men of virtue, or strength. He was opposed to a man being forfeited from his strength by a weak woman. He reminded Charles that he owed his kingship to the good graces of his papa.

The request to treat the White Guelfs badly are examples of the draconian stories of Boniface recorded by Compagni and Bruni. Compagni records that Boniface died enraged at the continued thwarting of his plans. Even in death those who haunted him attempted to mark him a heretic. The initiation of his papal reign began after the short lived papacy of Celestine.[5] Later when a bishopric became available he was wrongfully accused of selling that bishopric for personal gain. He consorted with men who treated other men very badly. Bruni’s commentary on the Holy Roman Church and Holy Roman Empire is enlightening for views of the republic amid foreign warfare.[6] 

Florence was the hub of Etruscan civic agitation during the incumbency of Pope Boniface whose presence was felt throughout the comune.[7] He was a persona that altered the course of history. Central to this investigation is the interplay of the Papal Court and Empire juxtaposed to factional strife between the Guelfs and Ghibellines, White and Black Guelfs, and the Black Guelf alliance with the Ghibellines in opposition to the White Guelfs.[8] A closer look at Pope Boniface VIII reveals a man of great strength and power who wielded his power to garner as much strength as was his to gain during his reign in the papal office. He was, in effect, a man of war. Yet the wars he fought were not waged by swords alone, but through a shifting network of alliances, rivalries, and political calculations. To see the landscape of power in which Boniface moved, Figure 1 charts the major factions, their loyalties, and the changes in alignment during his reign.

Figure 1. Faction–Relationship Map of the Florentine crisis during the reign of Pope Boniface VIII (1294–1303).

Faction–Relationship Map: Pope Boniface VIII (1294–1303) Diagram showing alliances, conflicts, and shifts between Papacy, Holy Roman Empire, White/Black Guelfs, Ghibellines, Charles of Valois, and Jean de Chalon during Boniface VIII's reign. Strong alliance: Papacy supported Black Guelfs (1301–1302) Weakened/eroded alliance: Papacy and White Guelfs under Boniface VIII Tactical cooperation at moments against the Whites Conflict: Whites vs. Blacks Conflict: Whites vs. Ghibellines Conflict: Blacks vs. Ghibellines Ideological opposition: Papal supremacy vs. Imperial rights Traditional alignment: Ghibellines supported Imperial authority (Holy Roman Empire) over Papal/Guelf interests Initial contract: Jean de Chalon hired by White leaders (c. 1301) Switch after payment dispute: Jean de Chalon to Ghibellines (Arezzo/Cortona) Papal mediation: reconciliation/settlement (20,000 florins) Papal designation: Charles of Valois sent to “make peace”, empowered Blacks Charles of Valois’s support strengthened Black Guelf dominance in Florence Pope Boniface VIII Papacy / Apostolic authority Holy Roman Empire Imperial authority White Guelfs Weakened under Boniface Black Guelfs Empowered 1301–1302 Ghibellines Imperial alignment Jean de Chalon Mercenary (500 horse) Charles of Valois Papal champion Legend Strong alliance Weakened alliance Conflict / hostility Tactical cooperation Mercenary shift Papal mediation
Faction–Relationship Map for the Florentine crisis during the reign of Pope Boniface VIII (1294–1303). Colors: Papal-aligned (gold), Imperial-aligned (silver), White/Black Guelfs (blue/purple), Ghibellines (red tint), Mercenary/agents (gray).

Political Turbulence and Demotic Names

The year 1300 was full of  “political turbulence [that] once again swept through Florence, possibly the greatest that had yet taken place.”[9] The conflict began as such: “In Pistoia in that period there was a flourishing clan, famous for its numbers as well as its riches.”[10] The clan was the Cancellieri family. Named such “in the native tongue, after the founder of the clan.”[11] Disharmony set in separating members of this family. They had gone their own ways. Now serious animosity and feuding “had driven them to blows and bloodshed.”[12] Bruni concludes,

Having stained and polluted themselves with the blood of their relatives, they had made the whole city divide itself up into factions favoring one side or the other, and (as usually happens) the factions were given demotic names: one was called the Whites, the other the Blacks. When, thanks to these factions, matters had reached a critical state in Pistoia, the Florentines became concerned and set about controlling in any way they could the disease that had now burst into the open. They decided the best thing to do, to cool things off, would be to remove the heads of the factions.[13]

Having stained and polluted themselves with the blood of their relatives, they had made the whole city divide itself up into factions favoring one side or the other, and (as usually happens) the factions were given demotic names: one was called the Whites, the other the Blacks. When, thanks to these factions, matters had reached a critical state in Pistoia, the Florentines became concerned and set about controlling in any way they could the disease that had now burst into the open.  They decided the best thing to do, to cool things off, would be to remove the heads of the factions.[13] 

The blood feuds so characterized by Bruni in this text were the opening salvos of clan feuding that endured during the thirteenth (trecento) and fourteenth (quattrocento) century Renaissance of Florence.[14] The “political turbulence” led to a frenzy of fighting that ruptured the very fabric of life in the comune. Family strife had far reaching implications within empire and church. The battle lines were drawn. The foundation was laid for the common man to become foot soldiers in the execution of plans for both pope and king. Common man was pitted against one another in an abrasive battle with the powerful citizens who aligned with either the Holy Roman Church or Holy Roman Empire. Herein lies the heart of the political turbulence of the Italian Renaissance.

Bruni notes that the Guelf factions of Pistoia were given “demotic names.”[15] A demotic name referred to a dialectal, or common, term in use at that time. While this terminology may be easily overlooked in reading the text, it appears that the wording reveals much regarding the origin of the party and its strife.  Limited historical information is recorded pertaining to the origin of the terms “White” and “Black” associated with the Guelf Party. No evidence suggests that this designation is related to ethnic distinction. This is more likely a reference to a popular perception of the two factions. The “White” designation refers to the good, or divine, and the “Black” refers to the bad, or demonic. Bruni was a White Guelf. From the perception of Bruni, for example, who, being a White Guelf, relays the demotic names of those who were termed “White” and “Black” due to the historian’s loyalty at the writing of these words.  Many years had passed prior to the authorship of Bruni’s History. The terms “White” and “Black” would have been acknowledged names for the parties at that juncture. For Compagni, the designation of the names to the factions was a contemporary to the authorship of his work.. He lived during the time of the name designation. Whatever the origin of “White” and Black” as names associated with the parties, the text reveals that these names were common in the vernacular of the day. 

Matters reached a boiling point in Pistoia. Florentine officials saw the damage from the strife inflicted on their sister city. The Florentines decided to take preventive action.  Bruni refers to the conflict among the factions as “disease.”[16] The disease “burst into the open” for all to see the irreparable damage done to the comune of Pistoia.[17] It was a matter of time until the disease spread to Florence which was only seven hours away by foot. 

The leaders of Florence determined to solve their Ghibelline concern  by removal of “the heads of the [Florentine] factions” with the hope of cooling things off.[18] Their efforts were helpless to stop the mercenary agendas of both the White and Black parties. The only remedy was to allow the disease to run its due course.

The Politics of Apostolic Authority

Even amid the harsh family conflict between the White and Black factions a confederacy of enemies prepared for war. That league was known as the Ghibelline faction. The Parte Guelfa being a house divided among itself was weakened. Regarding the Florentine leaders Bruni comments,

Fearing that this lasting breach between their party members would eventually resurrect the local Ghibelline faction, the leaders of the Guelf Party turned to Boniface VIII for help, begging him to remedy this potential- or rather nascent- danger with his apostolic authority. The pope’s efforts were in vain, and even harsher conflicts followed. The hatred grew so virulently that arms were often taken up. Eventually the faction called the Blacks could no longer tolerate their enemies’ political supremacy. They could not stand to see their enemies almost inevitably elected to all city offices.[19] 

 Of interest is the “lasting breach.”[20] Bruni offers a textual hint alerting the reader to the length of term of the conflict. The breach was long-term, even indefinite. Contextually, it is noted that the disconnect between Guelf Party and the “local Ghibelline faction” was far from new. The breach was enduring. The intensity of the present situation ran the risk of resurrecting what might have been viewed as a disease in remission. Upon this concern the leaders justified their next decision. That decision: retaliate.

Note the term “resurrect.” The long-term, enduring strife between the Guelfs and Ghibellines supports the idea of the potential resurrection of an old issue. The Guelf house sorely divided displayed their broken alliance for all to see. This nascent breach opened Pandora’s box which eventually led to the return of the Ghibelline faction. In a time when Parte Guelfa was weakened the Ghibellines took advantage of the rift. Seeing the handwriting on the wall the “leaders of the Guelf Party turned to Boniface VIII for help” because of fear for the inevitable.[21] The communal strife in Florence set the stage for greater political involvement of the papacy and the empire. 

The papacy represented the spiritual milieu while empire represented the non-spiritual, or secular.[22] The Ghibelline faction had a proclivity toward empire while the Guelf party had a tendency toward the papacy. Due to the ongoing strife within the Guelf Party an opportune time arose for an alliance to be created that was even stronger than had been made in the past. With foreboding in their minds, the Guelf leaders sought favor with Pope Boniface was the vicar of Christ and the direct spiritual descendant in the papal lineage of St. Peter. This was not enough. They desired the military strength of the Papal Court and her allies. Bruni here describes the narrative of how the Guelf party fell apart but does not describe the breach between Parte Guelfa and Ghibellines. The rift between Guelf and Ghibelline was far older than the nascent split of the Guelf Party.

The age old strife between Guelf and Ghibelline caused great concern among the prominent men of Florence. The Guelf Party was the predominant political party in Florence.[23] The Ghibelline question had apparently been in check until the issue of class struggle occurred resulting in the White and Black factions.

The men begged Pope Boniface to step into the conversation imploring him to “remedy this potential- or rather nascent- danger with his apostolic authority.”[24] Manetti’s commentary sheds tremendous light on a most difficult situation that had emerged for the leaders of the Guelf Party. What had previously been somewhat innocuous had become a potent threat to the very existence of the Florentine comune. Manetti states first that this was a “potential” danger. Then added edits to his commentary to say that the potential danger was actually a nascent, or emerging, threat for the Florentine people.

The Guelf Party leaders argued for protection from the pope based upon his “apostolic authority.” The idea of “apostolic authority” opens another layer of thought regarding the cultural intonation of the day. Of all authorities that could be appealed to, the Guelf Party leadership appealed to the most deeply held authority of the day within the realm of the Catholic Church, the Pope. Apostolic authority undergirded the spiritual supremacy of the papacy in distinction from any other spiritual or temporal power in the world. Temporal power united with the spiritual power ultimately represented spiritual dominion in the court of God and man. 

Even though the pope’s influence was expansive he was unable to calm the approaching storm. Rather than calming the waters, the conflicts became even harsher. What once had been a conflict among a few families became a deep hatred for one another. This hatred “grew so virulently that arms were often taken up.”[26] War erupted. The Guelf Party once united divided into an irreparable breach. The old Guelf Party retained the loyalty of the new Guelf Party in the form of the Whites. The Black Guelf Party “could no longer tolerate their enemies’ political supremacy” which led to an ever increasing level of violent behavior.[27]

Figure 2 offers a political mapping of relationships among the papacy, the White and Black Guelfs, and the Ghibellines. The papacy (Boniface VIII) claims universal spiritual supremacy that extends over temporal rulers (“I am Caesar—I am Emperor”), while the Holy Roman Empire insists on imperial rights and independence from papal control, including certain ecclesiastical rights. So the core division is spiritual supremacy vs. imperial autonomy—i.e., whether popes could command emperors or emperors could govern (and influence church matters) without the pope.

Figure 2. Political Relationship Map for Factional Alignments in Florence
Figure 2. Relationship Map of Florentine Factions (c. 1300) White Guelfs, Black Guelfs, and Ghibellines with Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire. Solid lines = alliance; dashed lines = tactical cooperation; red lines = enmity. Papacy (Boniface VIII) White Guelfs Papal-aligned Black Guelfs Pro-papal, hardline Ghibellines Imperial-aligned Holy Roman Empire (HRE) Legend Alliance Tactical cooperation Enmity / conflict
Note. Dashed Black–Ghibelline line indicates occasional tactical cooperation despite broader Guelf–Ghibelline hostility.

 I am Caesar. I am Emperor.

According to the papal theory in Catholic theology, the Pope alone was God’s spiritual representative on earth.  His was a unique and direct intercessory role of a man elected by God to be the divine representative upon earth. The Emperor received his authority to maintain his throne from St. Peter’s successor, the Pope. This distinction was most notably established during the reign of Pope Boniface VIII.  

Flick noted,

For historical proof of the genuineness of this position attention was called to the power of the keys, the Donation of Constantine, the coronation of Pepin, the restoration of the Empire in the West. … It was upheld by Nicholas I., Hildebrand, Alexander III., Innocent III., and culminated with Boniface VIII at the jubilee of 1300 when, seated on the throne of Constantine, girded with the imperial sword, wearing a crown, and waving a sceptre, he shouted to the throng of loyal pilgrims: “I am Caesar—I am Emperor.”[28]

The differences between the two authorities are summarized in the following table.

Table 1. Papal vs. Imperial Authority–Comparative Table
Aspect Papacy (Boniface VIII) Holy Roman Empire
Source of Legitimacy Apostolic succession from St. Peter Coronation by Pope; imperial tradition
Primary Goal Spiritual supremacy over temporal rulers Maintain imperial rights and independence from papacy
Allies Guelfs (esp. Blacks); pro-papal states Ghibellines; anti-papal states
Key Conflict Point Papal claim to authority over emperors Imperial claim to control over certain church rights

Note. Comparative overview of papal and imperial authority during the late 13th–early 14th century.

Flick offered as “proof of genuineness” the sources of papal authority over empire by appealing to past decisions and accepted tradition. To gain “historical proof of this position” one needs simply to look to “the power of the keys” to the kingdom given to St. Peter and the following proofs as asserted in the text. The proof was upheld by certain leaders associated with the Holy Church: Nicholas I, Hildebrand, Alexander III, Innocent III and brought to its fullness under Pope Boniface VIII.[29] To display in all his glory the culmination of the papal authority over empire, Boniface engages the celebration of Jubilee in 1300 to show his domination. While sitting upon the “throne of Constantine” with the imperial sword, crown, and scepter all in proper regalia he shouted that “I am Caesar- I am Emperor” denoting his power over all mankind.

Some Favored Popes, Some the Emperors

The struggle leading to a bold statement by Pope Boniface VIII alleging that he is Caesar and Emperor had its origin centuries earlier. There were ongoing conflicts between the Roman Pontiffs and the Emperors. These conflicts led to local wars and quarrels. On the origin of the conflict between the Guelf and Ghibelline factions Bruni stated,

The many disputes between the Roman pontiffs and emperors brought plentiful tinder to our local wars and quarrels. For the empire which began with Charlemagne and was founded mainly for the protection of the Roman church, once it was, as we have explained, transferred to Germany, fell into the hands of successors whose main purpose in life seemed to be the persecution and overthrow of the popes. What had once been a source of security became a vortex of evil. The cause of the hostility was essentially that the popes tried to hold on to certain ecclesiastical rights while the emperors tried to usurp them on the basis of outmoded prerogatives. Against the emperors the popes therefore directed the strongest possible condemnations and censures, which at the time were their only arms, and urged cities and princes to oppose the imperial excesses, threatening them with heavy punishments if any of them should obey the emperor's edicts. The emperors, terrible in arms, marched against them.  As the facts of the dispute remained ambiguous, attitudes varied; some favored the popes, some the emperors.[30] 

The age old conflict between the Guelfs and Ghibellines originated in 800. The conflict mentioned by Bruni is dated as 1300. The Parte Guelfa was divided in the White and Black factions during the fourteenth century (trecento). It was fully alive in the early fifteenth century (quattrocento). The breach between the Guelfs and Ghibellines was a five hundred year old problem. The leaders of the Guelf Party were concerned that the breach between the Whites and Black would renew the conflict between the Guelfs and Ghibellines. The leaders were correct. The Black Guelf faction migrated toward the Ghibelline faction.

The empire begun with Charlemagne was founded to protect the Roman church. It’s purpose was not to be in conflict with the Holy Roman Church but to be a support for the ongoing preservation of the Papal State. Yet, when time passed and the power of the empire was transferred to another generation in Germany, the intent of the successors was to persecute and overthrow the popes. An occasion borne of protection became the engine for persecution. Or, as Bruni concludes, “a vortex of evil.”[31] 

The hostility originated over a question of ecclesiastical rights. With arms to conquer the new enemy, the emperors became the aggressors through condemnations and censures. Pope Boniface declared that the office of pope was the single most powerful vicar and king in the known world. In short, Boniface declared himself the most powerful vicar and king. This is the assertion that the Holy Roman Church had supplanted the Holy Roman Empire. It is upon this background that the White Guelf Party appealed to him to exercise his apostolic authority to protect Florence against the Black Guelf Party. The White Guelfs petitioned for a declaration of war. 

To clarify how the balance of power shifted, Figure 1 charts relative influence among three poles—the Papacy/Black Guelfs, the White Guelfs, and the Ghibellines aligned with the Holy Roman Empire (HRE)—from 1299 to 1303. Higher bands signal greater leverage in Florentine affairs, with callouts marking key inflection points (the 1300 Jubilee, Valois’s arrival in 1301, the Blacks’ ascendancy in 1302, and Anagni in 1303).

Figure 3. Shifts in faction dominance, 1299–1303 (schematic)
Figure 3. Shifts in faction dominance, 1299–1303 (schematic) Three bands indicate relative influence over time: Papal/Black ascendancy (green), White Guelf influence (blue), and Ghibelline pressure aligned with the Holy Roman Empire (red). Higher vertical position ~ greater influence. High Med Low 1299 1300 1301 1302 1303 1300 Jubilee 1301 Valois arrives 1302 Blacks ascend Receiver of Kings and Grantor of Titles

To strengthen the Papal military presence Pope Boniface VIII formed alliances with powers including Charles, Count of Valois (1270-1325) and fourth son of King Philip III of France (1270-1285). The house of Valois was part of the Capetian dynasty that succeeded the French throne.

 The alliance displays the tactical and strategic mind of the pope. His joint venture with Charles of Valois the pope was an alignment with “a large entourage of barons.” The pontiff received Charles with a splendid welcome while the king dreamed of “great hope of brilliant deeds.”[32] Bruni comments,

In the same year [1301] around the first of September a shining star, which they call a comet, appeared in the heavens. It was followed soon after by the coming of Charles of Valois to Italy. With a large entourage of barons he went to Pope Boniface, who was then residing in Anagni, and was received splendidly by the pontiff who granted him titles of honor, for Charles had brought with him great hope of brilliant deeds.[33]

The bilateral benefit of the alliance was the reception of the large entourage of barons allowed for the connection of the House of Valois to the Papal State and the connection of the Papal State to the French monarchy. The coalition for secular-sacred power was now solidified. The foundation of war was intact.

When the Shepherd is Struck, the Sheep will Scatter

Giano della Bella (1240-1305) was a Florentine aristocrat and a man of immense wealth. He led the popular movement, developed the “Ordinances of Justice” (1293) which later became the foundation document for the constitution of Florence. He became the target for assassination by the nobility (monied landowners).

The diligent plans to administer the death of Giano della Bella were designed to weaken the opposing party. Giano della Bella was in such a strong position of leadership that the opposition feared what might occur if he were to remain in power. Bruni explains, “The powerful citizens (who were not all noble by blood, but for other reasons were labeled magnates), out of scorn for the popolo, tried to attack it in many ways.”[34] 

The designation “powerful citizens” aids in understanding the power base in the comune.  Those who were considered powerful in the citizenry were thus categorized by two distinctions:  one, powerful citizens due to birth into the power elite, or “noble by blood;” two, powerful citizens due to their capitalist status whether inherited or newly acquired nouveau-riche. Birth and wealth were the common denominators in the equation leading to the idea of “powerful citizens.” Implicit in the idea of “powerful citizens” is that of class distinction. The “powerful citizens” were the haves who resisted the notion of another influence (the have nots) in the comune who might have the nascent ability to challenge the status quo. The “powerful citizens” of the nobility and merchant class had scorn for the popolo. In this context “scorn” is that sense of despicable contempt for another. Neither class desired close proximity to the other. The nobility (“powerful citizens”) despised the common man (the popolo) and the common man despised the nobility. 

The popolo were by definition the people. The popolo sprang up as an advocacy group for the common man comprised of the wealthy merchants and businessmen of the Italian Renaissance era. The goal of the popolo was to protect the interests of the common man against the nobility (“the powerful citizens”). The popolo were the new urban nobility.  The “powerful citizens” who by blood were nobility or who had accumulated wealth were the landed gentry.  The popolo being monied were wealthy merchants and businessmen who were considered to be a part of working class.

Table 2. Economic and Political Power Players in Florence
Group Description Influence
Popolo Wealthy merchants and businessmen Advocated for common people against the nobility
Powerful Citizens (Magnates) Nobility or wealthy elite Controlled city offices; opposed popolo
Banking Families (e.g., Spini) Financiers Supported papal interventions; influenced politics

Note. Key social and economic groups shaping Florentine political life during the late medieval period.

According to Compagni,

The nobility brought from Champagne a brave and bold knight named messer Jean de Chalons, a man more powerful than loyal, who had some jurisdictions given him by the emperor. He came to Tuscany allied with the magnates of Florence and by the will of the newly created Pope Boniface VIII. He held title and jurisdiction to whatever lands he might win. And men such as messer Vieri de’ Cerchi and Nuto Marignolli agreed to this in order to crush the popolo of Florence, according to the report of messer Piero Cane of Milan, the procurator of the aforesaid messer Jean de Chalons. They laid many plans to kill Giano della Bella, saying: ‘When the shepherd is struck, the sheep will scatter.’[35]

The powerful citizens of Florence brought from Champagne a powerful man to assist in accomplishing their desired ends. The significance of this text is to illustrate the nature of alliance during the trecento period of the Renaissance across ethnic, cultural and geographical boundaries.  The Italians engaged the French to assist in conquering their enemy. This assembly of high ranking officers consulted with the commanders to determine war strategy for victory. The war council was established to jointly overpower their common enemy. Now off to war.

Champagne is a province in the northeast of France approximately 100 miles east of Paris.  This epicenter became a resource for militant action in Italy. According to Evergates, Champagne was ruled by independent counts. Powers independent of other local powers but collectively a regional strength with influence throughout Europe. Three nascent factors appear in the development of the region: the rise of the comital[36] state, fief holding,[37] and the conjugal family.[38]  This resulted in a shaping of baronial and knightly families into regional medieval aristocracy.[39] 

During this time the baronial state solidified as a dominant power source. The emergence of the comital state displays the strengthening of lineage. The count or earl inherited his power and wealth by birth. The military structure was a formalized military inasmuch as military had formality during this era. The emergence of the fief holdings displayed the strengthening of warring factions that vied for domination. Upon these structures Boniface levered his power through the French domain.

Papal Letter and Internecine Discord

Giano della Bella’s death in exile is an example of a life altered because of the nuance of Florentine politics. The leaders of the city received great “pressure from the common people to recall Giano della Bella, as the one citizen who seemed uniquely suited to crush the power of the nobility.”[40] The people wanted him “because they had seen the recklessness of the nobility and its attempt to abrogate the laws.”[41] When the pressure increased to bring him out of exile, his adversaries had recourse to Pope Boniface. The pope instructed the people and the magistrates by letter not to recall Giano della Bella, his brother Taldo or his nephew Ranieri; not to confer upon them any honor or dignity; and not to let them enter the city. If they did, he would lay heavy penalties upon those responsible and indeed the entire city. The rationale as expressed in the letter was that Giano had been a sower of discord among his fellow-citizens. Giano’s return was blocked because of this letter. A citizen who had deserved well of his people and who had safeguarded its authority against the powerful died in exile, deserted by his ungrateful countrymen.[42] 

I Will Help You Fight Them Like Mortal Enemies

As a further look at the mercenary mechanism of the strategic alliance of the Papal State between the House of Chalon Bruni shares,  “Messer Jean de Chalons, who had come at the request of the magnates, wanting to fulfill what he had promised and to acquire what he had been promised, asked for his pay for the five hundred horsemen he had brought with him.”[43] Having invested his capital and the time involved to travel by horseback with five hundred men and horses from the Chalon area of France to the Tuscan region of Italy, Jean de Chalon expected to be paid what was contracted with him as his reward for the willingness to serve. He arrived at the request of the magnates of the Guelf Party who summarily refused to pay. His remuneration “was denied him, on the grounds that he had not accomplished what he had promised to do.”[44] What had been promised was to overpower the Black Guelf Party. 

Of course, this breach was unacceptable to de Chalon. He was a knight. A Templar knight to be specific. He was a man of great spirit. What had begun as a plan to shift the battle in favor of the Florentine Parte Guelfa, the Whites, was now a considerable liability and threat to their very survival. Jean de Chalon was a businessman and a mercenary.

He went off to Arezzo, to the adversaries of the Florentines, and said to them: “‘Lords, I came to Tuscany at the request of the Guelfs of Florence: here are the papers. They broke our agreement; because of this, my companions and I will help you fight them like mortal enemies.’ The Ubertini and the people of Arezzo and Cortona honored them for this.”[45] 

Being a man whose services were for hire he departed the Florentine leaders and offered his services to the enemy of the Florentines. This commentary highlights the mind of the Florentines as compared to the mind of the French. The Guelf Party- both White and Black- were philosophically, even religiously, invested in the fight between the parties. The French warrior was invested financially without the philosophical and religious being a part of the equation. He and his army were for hire. They were ready to make war.

De Chalon approached the Ubertini, the Arezzo, and Cortona war council providing the contractual documents that had been breached by the Parte Guelfa. He enumerated the terms of the agreement between the house of Chalon and the house of Parte Guelfa. He explained, “they broke our agreement; because of this, my companions and I will help you fight them like mortal enemies.[46] The recording of this sentence reveals much about the mind of Jean de Chalon.  A contract was established. A contract was broken. He was provided a contract which was broken. As a result he was a free agent with 500 men at his command. He came to Italy for war. Whoever honors the terms of the contract would receive the value of his services. His offer? He would fight those in breach as his own mortal enemy if the leaders of the Black Party would honor the terms of the agreement.

As one would expect “the Florentines, hearing of this, sent to Pope Boniface, asking him to step in and arrange an accord between them. He did so. He decided that the Florentines should give messer Jean twenty thousand florins, which they did.”[47] The pope’s emissary assisted in arrangement a renegotiation which was consummated by a premium payment for his services. 

Further, Bruni states,

And since they were friends again, and seeing that the Aretines trusted him, the Florentines arranged with him that he should return to Arezzo and pretend to be our enemy. He was supposed to induce them to attack San Miniato, which he could claim belonged to him as representative of the Empire, and for which he had come and had a mandate. But someone who knew the secret revealed it out of flightiness and to show that he knew about secret things; and the person to whom he revealed it passed the information to messer Ceffo de’ Lamberti. The Aretines heard of it through him and told the knight and his men to leave.[48]

He Ruled the Church as He Saw Fit

Pope Boniface ruled as a king on St. Peter’s throne. As a man known for his boldness and intelligence, he ruled the church as he desired and eliminated anyone who would not agree with him. He had banking support and the endorsement of the wealthy. Bruni states, At that time the throne of St. Peter was occupied by Pope Boniface VIII, who was a man of great boldness and high intelligence; and he ruled the Church as he saw fit and brought low whoever did not agree with him. He was supported by his bankers, the Spini, a rich and powerful Florentine family.[49] 

The Florentines had as their agent Simone Gherardi whose work was to convince the pope of the lower reputation of the Cerchi. As a result of the coaching of Gherardi and Cambi the pope sent a cardinal to pacify the Florentines. His mission was for nought due to lack of authority from the Florentines. He left Florence in anger.

Simone Gherardi, a man well practiced in this business, resided in Rome as their agent; and with him was a Florentine named Nero Cambi, the son of a silver refiner, an astute man of subtle intelligence, but crude and unpleasant. The man worked so hard to convince the pope to lower the prestige of the Cerchi and their followers that the pope sent to Florence the friar messer Matteo di Acquasparta, cardinal of Porto, to pacify the Florentines. But the cardinal accomplished nothing because the factions would not grant him the powers he wanted, and so he left Florence in anger.[50] 

The Florentines were concerned about the influence of the Cerchi since they were supporters of the Ghibelline faction. Even though the Guelf Party expended resources to garner the support of the pope they refused to grant the pope’s emissary the authority needed to carry out the directives of the pope. Compagni continues,

The pope sent enticing words with one hand and with the other set this lord over us; once he saw that messer Charles had entered the city, he stopped his blandishments and used threats. One of the ambassadors betrayed us and revealed the papal message, which the others should not have been able to hear. And Simone Gherardi had written to them from the Papal Court, saying that the pope had told him: ‘I do not want to lose men for weak women.’ The Black Guelfs took counsel over this. They judged from these words that the ambassadors had come to an agreement with the pope, and said: ‘If they are united, we are lost.’ They thought they should wait to see what action the Priors would take, saying: ‘If they reject the pope’s offer, we are dead; if they accept it, let us seize our swords and take from them whatever we can.’ And so they did. As soon as they heard that the magistrates would obey the pope they immediately armed themselves and began to attack the city with fire and sword, devastating and destroying it. The Priors wrote to the pope in secret, but the Black Party knew their movement since those who swore secrecy did not keep it.[51]

The pope sent enticing words with one hand and with the other set this lord over us; once he saw that messer Charles had entered the city, he stopped his blandishments and used threats. One of the ambassadors betrayed us and revealed the papal message, which the others should not have been able to hear. And Simone Gherardi had written to them from the Papal Court, saying that the pope had told him: ‘I do not want to lose men for weak women.’ The Black Guelfs took counsel over this. They judged from these words that the ambassadors had come to an agreement with the pope, and said: ‘If they are united, we are lost.’ They thought they should wait to see what action the Priors would take, saying: ‘If they reject the pope’s offer, we are dead; if they accept it, let us seize our swords and take from them whatever we can.’ And so they did. As soon as they heard that the magistrates would obey the pope they immediately armed themselves and began to attack the city with fire and sword, devastating and destroying it. The Priors wrote to the pope in secret, but the Black Party knew their movement since those who swore secrecy did not keep it.[51] 

Nascent Evil and Peace Accords

A most interesting text has been provided by Compagni that sheds much light on the ongoing war between the Guelfs and Ghibellines. A certain Messer Corso Donati, of the Guelf affection, was in exile and under arrest being confined to Massa Trabaria. He did not obey. “He broke his bounds and went off to Rome, for which he was condemned in his goods and his person.[52] 

Donati’s mission was to convince the pope to intervene on behalf of the Guelf constituency.  “Together with Nero Cambi, who was the Spini representative at the Papal Court, and through the mediation of messer Iacopo Caetani (a kinsman of the pope) and some of the Colonna, he insistently entreated the pope to remedy the situation because the Parte Guelfa in Florence was being destroyed while the Cerchi supported the Ghibellines.”[53] 

Donati corralled the banking family and a kinsman of the pope to assist in making his case to the pope. This is but another account of the Florentine emissaries seeking relief from the pope due to aggression by the Ghibelline Cerchi. 

The pope summoned Vieri de’ Cerchi “who went very honorably to Rome. At the request of his bankers, the Spini, and of the aforementioned friends and relatives, the pope asked him to make peace with messer Corso. However, messer Vieri would not agree to this, but explained that he was doing nothing against the Guelf Party. He was then given leave to go and he departed.”

Bruni chronicles his history of the conflict by stating,

When the whole city had been divided by their quarrels, and it was feared that disaster would surely follow, the leaders of the Guelf Party, worried that the Ghibelline faction would rise again in the city because of the divisions that had sprung up between these men, had recourse to Pope Boniface. They pointed out to him the danger and demanded that he use his authority to check the nascent evil. Once he understood the situation, the pontiff summoned Vieri de’Cerchi, the leader of the family, and exhorted him at great length to lay aside his feud and make peace with Corso Donati, the leader of the Donati family. The pope had no doubt (he said) that, once the two of them were reconciled, the rest would follow suit. Despite many promises the pope was unable to persuade Vieri to do this, however; the latter kept claiming that he really had no quarrel with anyone. So, thanks to Vieri, the matter was not settled by papal intervention, and most people set this down against him as a great error. Certainly he gave no little offense to the pope, especially since his adversary Corso, who shortly before had been asked the very same thing by the pontiff, replied that he would do everything in his power.[54]

When the whole city had been divided by their quarrels, and it was feared that disaster would surely follow, the leaders of the Guelf Party, worried that the Ghibelline faction would rise again in the city because of the divisions that had sprung up between these men, had recourse to Pope Boniface. They pointed out to him the danger and demanded that he use his authority to check the nascent evil. Once he understood the situation, the pontiff summoned Vieri de’Cerchi, the leader of the family, and exhorted him at great length to lay aside his feud and make peace with Corso Donati, the leader of the Donati family. The pope had no doubt (he said) that, once the two of them were reconciled, the rest would follow suit. Despite many promises the pope was unable to persuade Vieri to do this, however; the latter kept claiming that he really had no quarrel with anyone. So, thanks to Vieri, the matter was not settled by papal intervention, and most people set this down against him as a great error. Certainly he gave no little offense to the pope, especially since his adversary Corso, who shortly before had been asked the very same thing by the pontiff, replied that he would do everything in his power.[54] 

Bruni comments adding certain unique thoughts of the situation. The term “nascent evil” implies an emerging threat. The term “papal intervention” suggests the engagement of sovereign power to influence the situation. Neither Donati nor Cerchi followed through with their commitment to the pontiff. Corso Donati fled the city having “lost no time in resorting to the pope, in order zealously to execute the plan of the earlier meeting.”[55] 

Eloquently Bruni comments, “Once Donati had gained access to the pope, he pressured him and stirred him up with continual requests; he was an eloquent man, with a pleasant and happy face, and very astute when it came to practical affairs. Using his arts, he was able to turn the pontiff’s mind and spirit to mending the Florentine situation.”[56] Such is the value of the envoy to the sovereign entity.

The Pope was Persuaded to Break the Power of the Florentines

The citizens of Florence became slanderous toward one another fueled by division among the parties. “The citizens of Florence, divided like this, began to slander one another throughout the neighboring cities and in Pope Boniface’s court at Rome, spreading false information. And words falsely spoken did more damage to Florence than the points of the swords.[57] According to Compagni,

They worked on the pope, telling him that the city would return to the hands of the Ghibellines and become a bastion for the Colonna, and they reinforced these lies with a great deal of money. The pope was persuaded to break the power of the Florentines, and so he promised to aid the Black Guelfs with the great power of Charles of Valois, of the royal house of France, who had set out from France to oppose Frederick of Aragon in Sicily. The pope wrote that he wanted messer Charles to make peace in Tuscany, opposing those who had rebelled against the Church. This commission of peacemaker had a very good name, but its purpose was just the opposite, for the pope’s aim was to bring down the Whites and raise up the Blacks, and make the Whites enemies of the royal house of France and of the Church.[58]

They worked on the pope, telling him that the city would return to the hands of the Ghibellines and become a bastion for the Colonna, and they reinforced these lies with a great deal of money.  The pope was persuaded to break the power of the Florentines, and so he promised to aid the Black Guelfs with the great power of Charles of Valois, of the royal house of France, who had set out from France to oppose Frederick of Aragon in Sicily. The pope wrote that he wanted messer Charles to make peace in Tuscany, opposing those who had rebelled against the Church. This commission of peacemaker had a very good name, but its purpose was just the opposite, for the pope’s aim was to bring down the Whites and raise up the Blacks, and make the Whites enemies of the royal house of France and of the Church.”[58] 

 The argument was that the Florentine lands would be restored to the Ghibellines and become a bastion for the Colonna who would be a friend of the Pontifical State. With many lies and money disbursed the pope was persuaded to “break the power of the Florentines.”[59] The pope gave his word to “aid the Black Guelfs with the great power of Charles of Valois” which would be devastating to the White Guelfs due to the strength possessed by Charles.[60]  

4. Major Conflicts and Outcomes
Conflict Date(s) Factions Outcome
White vs. Black Guelf split Late 1290s Whites vs. Blacks Long-term destabilization of Florence.
Jean de Chalon contract dispute c. 1301–1302 Whites vs. Jean de Chalon (mercenary) De Chalon joins Ghibellines; later reconciled after papal intervention.
Papal support for Blacks 1301–1302 Papacy, Blacks vs. Whites Shifted Florence’s balance of power toward Blacks.
Anagni incident 1303 Papacy vs. Colonna / King of France Boniface captured; dies shortly after release.

He Feared the Pope Very Much

The following narrative is a short but important window into the mind of Bruni as he recorded the history of the Florentine people. The Priors chose forty citizens from both factions and sought their advice about the safety of the city, “so that they would not be held suspect by either faction. Those with bad intentions kept silent; the others had lost their strength.”[61]

Several leaders of the people spoke at the rostrum. Among those who exhorted the people was Messer Lapo Salterelli who feared the pope very much because of the harsh charges the pope had lodged against him, and he wanted to improve his relations with his foes.  So he took the rostrum and accused the Priors, saying: ‘You are destroying Florence.  Choose new signori from both factions and let the exiles come home to the city.’ And in his house he had messer Pazzino de’ Pazzi, who was exiled, trusting the messer Pazzino would protect him when he returned to power.[62]

The pope advanced his agenda militarily and with the war of words. The charges made by Boniface were so harsh and fear inducing that Salterelli chose to begin strengthening his relationship with his enemies. Enemies make strange bedfellows. Salterelli spoke plainly that the Priors of the comune were destroying the very fabric of the city-state by the continued battle within their own confines. He argued that leaders should be developed from both factions and to bring the exiles home.  To do so unites enemies under one agenda and recalls the exiled leaders.  If this were to occur the risk to Salterelli would be diminished.

 Ambassadors of the Pope’s Words

Compagni tells the story of two ambassadors returning to Florence after having seen the pope.[63] One ambassador was Maso di messer Ruggierino Minerbetti. Minerbetti was “a false popolano who did not stand by his own opinion but followed that of others.”[64] Minerbetti proclaimed his allegiance to the common and pronounced his status of popolano, one who protected the common man from the powerful citizens (nobility).  Even though he claimed high status he was noted by Compagni as being a false popolano.

The other ambassador was Corazza da Signa. Signa “considered himself so Guelf that he hardly believed that the Guelf spirit was still alive in anyone else.” He was a Guelf purist of sorts. Contrary to Minerbetti who did not stand by his own conviction but shifted to align with the opinions of others, Signa was a man of deep conviction. It appears that Minerbetti and Signa were perfect travel companions to serve as ambassadors to the papal office on behalf of Florence.

Compagni concluded, “They reported the pope’s words. I was then responsible for holding back this message. I held it back and swore the ambassadors to secrecy; but it was not out of malice that I delayed it.”[65] The courier was the valued messenger of the terms of war.

God Favored Them, The Pope Helped Them, Charles Championed Them

The constant conflict in Florence led many to fear the loss of their private wealth. The times were marked with unrest and instability throughout the comune. “Many fortunes were hidden in secret places; many people changed their tune from one day to the next.”[66] Compagni continues,

The discontent led to “many villainous and unjust things” that were said against the old Priors, even by those who a short time before had praised them. They were greatly slandered to please their adversaries and suffered much ill-treatment. Those who spoke badly of them were lying, because the old Priors were entirely dedicated to the common good and the well-being of the republic. But it was useless to contest this because their foes were full of confidence: God favored them; the pope helped them; they had messer Charles as their champion; they did not fear any enemies.[67]

The theater of public opinion shifts like the waves of the sea in times of stormy weather.  Men who had been praised only a short time before were now wickedly and wrongfully slandered. All that was said of the Priors was untruth since these men “were entirely dedicated to the common good and the well-being of the republic.”[68]

 In The Fountain of Gold

Charles completed his task of reestablishing the Black Party in Florence after which he went to Rome.  There “he asked for money from the pope, who replied that the had put him in the fountain of gold.”[69] Charles had earned the confidence of Boniface. He now commanded what appeared to be endless resources for the execution of war. 

The Black Party was less inclined toward the papacy than the White Party. The White Party was traditionally aligned with the Pontifical State while the Ghibellines were aligned with the Holy Roman Empire. Since the Black Party aligned with the Ghibellines, a fundamental change in worldview was in
transition. The Black Party migrated away from the papacy to the mind of the
emperor.

 Pope’s Request to Treat the Whites Badly

In Arezzo, an old Ghibelline held out for the hope that his son would be appointed a cardinal by Pope Boniface. The day never arrived. Even so, in his vain hope the old Ghibelline “treated the whites so badly that they had to leave.”[70] All of this at the request of the Boniface. The old Ghibelline had held that this would win favor with the pope.[71] 

Many horrible misfortunes befell the White and Ghibelline Party.”[72] This single sentence shares an insight into the world of the Tuscan factions. Terrible misfortunes were upon the White Guelf Party and the Ghibelline Party but not upon the Black Guelf Party. These misfortunes were instigated by Pope Boniface and carried out by those similar to the old Ghibelline. His was a strategic war.

 A Few Days Later He Died Enraged

Here ends the life of Pope Boniface. His domain was under siege. During the course of events he died. Compagni chronicles,

On Saturday, September 7, 1303, Sciarra della Colonna entered Anagni, a city subject to Rome, together with a large troop and the men of Ceccano and a knight who was there on behalf of the king of France, bearing the king’s banner and that of the Patrimony, that is, the Keys of Saint Peter. They broke open the sacristy and strongbox of the pope and plundered it of much treasure. The pope, abandoned by his followers, was taken prisoner. It was said that the cardinal messer Francesco Orsini was there in person, along with many Roman citizens. And the king of France was thought to be involved in this plot because the pope was striving to humble him: it was said to be the pope’s doing that the Flemish made war on him and brought death to many Frenchmen.[73]

Colonna entered Anagni with many men and a knight representing the king of France with both the king’s banner and the Patrimony or the “Keys of Saint Peter.” The keys were a symbol of papal authority reminiscent of Peter being told that he would receive the keys to the kingdom of heaven. As Colonna entered the city with the king’s banner and the pope’s banner, the declaration was a deconstruction of the assertion made by Boniface three years earlier at Jubilee that “I am Caesar – I am Emperor.”

It was believed that the king of France was involved since the pope had hoped to humble the king. In response the king assembled those with the authority to unseat the pope. For this reason the king of France assembled in Paris many masters and bachelors of theology, Franciscans and Dominicans and members of many other orders, and there had the pope pronounced a heretic, and then had him reprimanded, charging him with many horrible sins. The pope was captured at Anagni; and without giving any defense or explanation he was led to Rome, where he was wounded in the head and a few days later died enraged.[74]

Many were pleased and delighted by his death, because he ruled cruelly and provoked wars, crushing many people and accumulating much wealth. The Whites and Ghibellines rejoiced especially, because he was their mortal enemy; but the Blacks grieved over it greatly.”[75]

 Pope Boniface, A Heretic

Compagni discussed theological concepts in his work whereas these are noticeably absent from Bruni’s History. Here Compagni introduces divine justice and providence, “Divine justice, which often punishes in hidden ways, and takes good pastors away from wicked people who do not deserve them and gives them instead that which their malice deserves, took from them Pope Benedict.”[76]

Several years after the death of Boniface, “through the will of the king of France and the efforts of the Colonna, the cardinals elected pope messer Ramondo de Got, archbishop of Bordeaux in Gascony, who took the name Clement V.”[77]

Clement remained on that side of the Alps and did not travel to Rome, but was consecrated at Lyons on the Rhone. It was said that “at his consecration the place collapsed in ruins, and that the crown fell from his head, and that the king of France would not let him leave there. At the king’s request he created many cardinals from that side of the Alps and arranged many tithes and other things; but when asked to publicly declare Pope Boniface a heretic, he would never do so.”[78]

Bruni and the Papal Curia

An immediate value noted in the work of Bruni in his History is the use of commentary with appraisal judgment.[79] For example, in this text Bruni concludes that “I have found nothing worth recording in foreign affairs for the following year.”[80] The appraisal judgment is a common tactic of Bruni throughout the three volumes of his History.

A careful consideration of this method exposes a deeper value to the penmanship of Bruni. He was a Florentine of many years, he served as Papal Curia for nearly a decade, he wrote numerous biographies of men such as Dante and Aristotle, he served in many official capacities in the Republic of Florence, and experienced the travesty of ongoing war. At the time he authored these works Bruni was passing into the twilight of his journey on earth. He was born in 1370 and died in 1444. Those years in particular reveal the most vibrant changes from the trecento to the quattrocento. 1404 is marked as the transition from the medieval period to the true time of Renaissance. For Bruni to have chronicled the times of greatest transition in the history of the Florentine Republic is to chronicle the birth of the western mind.

Bruni was certainly a qualified man of letters as well as a dignitary of the Florentine Republic and representative of the Papal State. When he wrote the three-volume History he was no longer a young man seeking his signature as an author; rather he was an accomplished man considered a sage whose ambassadorial qualities allowed him to transition regime change even into the reign of the Medici family—an accomplishment not to be lightly passed over in our consideration. He not only continued in his work post-regime change but was paid well for his work.

Holy Roman Church and Holy Roman Empire

To further explore Bruni’s comment, “I have found nothing worth recording in foreign affairs for the following year” consider the geopolitical implications.[81] Florence was a power within her own right. What is known in the modern era as Italy was more commonly referred to as the “Peninsula” or the “Etruscan” (modern Tuscany) region during the Renaissance. The Peninsula was a land mass partitioned into independent powers. A sampling of these independent powers includes the monarchy, the republic and the duchy. The monarchy was represented in the Papal State and the kingdom of Naples. The Republic was represented in the comune of Florence and Venice. The Duchy was represented as a constituent state of the Holy Roman Empire in Milan. For all practical purposes, the duchy of Milan was a despotic state.

These entities were geographically bound to one another but they were independent city-states and foreign powers nonetheless. Thus, as independent states each had its own independent corporate and communal goals, finances, trade, alliances, military and thirst for power. To Bruni, a foreign power was any power external to the Republic of Florence regardless of whether the external power was friend or foe. In this sense, Pisa, a maritime republic, was a foreign power although only less than fifty miles away from Bruni’s beloved Florence. Even though a republic, the interests of Pisa and Florence collided into warring contradictions so that the republics entered into harsh battle for dominance. The Republic of Lucca was an independent republic. As a foreign power Lucca was only thirty-nine miles from Florence and sixteen miles from Pisa. The maritime Republic of Pisa and the Republic of Florence were in constant conflict over the dominance of the Republic of Lucca. Lucca was a foreign power in the eyes of both Pisan and Florentine leaders. Pisa was a foreign power in the eyes of the Luccan and Florentine leaders. Florence was a foreign power in the eyes of the Luccan and Pisan leaders.

From his comprehensive view Bruni offered an important observation: “I have found nothing worth recording in foreign affairs for the following year.”[82] The temptation is to gloss over such a simple thought. This author esteems this sentence as a defining footnote of sorts to Bruni’s commentary. The sentence sheds much light on the intent of Bruni in the authorship of the History. By far the majority of the three volumes of Bruni’s History is entirely focused on the positioning of Florence as a glorious republic in comparison to all other foreign powers within the peninsula as well as external powers beyond the borders of the Etruscan lands, the boundaries of the Italian Peninsula extending into the France, Germany, and the British lands. All external entities were foreign to Bruni and subject to being compared to Bruni’s glorious Republic of Florence. From his broad survey of history a stratified canvas begins to emerge of the presence of larger dominant powers. Conflicting interests such as the Pontifical State in the form of the Catholic Church, the Holy Roman Empire deeply embedded in the Franco-Germanic agendas, the competing trifecta depicted in monarchy, republic and tyranny, and the early attempt at amalgamation of the Parte Guelfa with the Ghibelline constituents which ultimately disintegrated into deadly strife among the White and Black Guelf factions and the interplay of Ghibelline faction.

Note Bruni’s chronicle of activities in “foreign affairs” in the year 1293. Bruni first chronicles the Pisan war with Florence. In this portion of the History he asserts the influence of Florence in the determination of the outcome of negotiations for peace. Pisa was engaged in battle although a continued engagement would have surely meant a loss by Pisa and victory for the allies. As with all wartime negotiations there was difficulty in agreeing “on peace as all the allies [of Florence], especially the Lucchesi and Judge Ugolino of Gallura, were highly critical of the negotiations, believing victory to be within their grasp.”[83] The allies desired battle for dominance yet the “will of the Florentines triumphed, and peace was finally made the following year” with Pisa.[84] Peace has always had a price. The agreement to negotiate peace was a wise move on the part of the Pisans as any decision of aggression would have surely meant destruction to the Pisan way of life. The price to be paid was to be formulated in terms of governing power and economic sanctions.

The allies of Florence, the republics of Pistoia and Lucca, agreed to cease aggression since “to do otherwise would have compelled them to make war without the Florentines, a task beyond their powers.”[85] Bruni’s conclusion in this instance is again a note in favor of the power and influence of the Florentine republic. This pivotal comment elucidates Bruni’s ideology of the glory of Florence as the core message of his History. The peace negotiations resulted in the concession that “the Pisans’ chief judicial magistrate was to be chosen, for a period of two years, only from among those cities or towns that had been allies with the Florentines and Lucchesi in the late war against Pisa.”[86] This, of course, was a power positioning by Florence and the allies to ensure that the allied influence was strong in Pisan government. This treaty term particularly benefits the alliance as a whole.

However, the Florentines required a term involving matters of trade which ultimately had economic repercussions. According to Bruni, “The Florentines were to enjoy perpetual immunity [from taxation] when importing and exporting goods by land and sea through Pisa.”[87] Considering that the trade factors in wealth creation for the Florentine guilds included products such as cloth, grain, and other supplies which were suited best for commerce with other powers in the peninsula as well as trade including export by way of sea, this term was a direct embargo on an important product of the Pisan economy. By comparison, think of the maritime power of the Republic of Venice whose entire economy was built on their prowess to conduct trade by way of sea. Prior to the development of the Venetian merchant ships for trade, the islands of Venice had little opportunity to enjoy the great strength of unique channels of trade. Removing the ability to fully engage in trade by use of their ports would have been a tremendous restriction on all future growth of all Venetian capitalistic endeavors. So it was with Pisa.

Florence had trade relationships with both Pisa and Venice. Venice and Pisa were two very different republics on opposite coasts of the peninsula. Pisa existed on the western coast while Venice was positioned on the northeastern coast of the peninsula. Pisa was less than fifty miles from Florence and Venice was 161 miles from Florence. Rugged geography made transportation a real factor. Yet, both republics brought great value to the Florentine economy. Pisa was a door to the west leading south along the coast of Italy across to Spain, Portugal, France, and England while Venice was a door east to the Byzantine empire and beyond. Siena was a foreign power forty-three miles from Florence. Siena was a foreign power 43 miles from Florence. The power of alliance and influence of Florence in the negotiation led to a final statement on the terms of peace between Pisa and the alliance. Bruni notes, “These were the terms on the Pisan side. The Florentines agreed to return the castle of Pecciole.”[88] The Papal State in Rome was a foreign power 170 miles from Florence. Naples was a foreign power less than 300 miles from Florence. Milan was a foreign power 155 miles from Florence. Venice was a foreign power 161 miles from Florence. This was the territory for engagement of war.

These three forms of government—monarchy, republic, and tyranny—were fundamentally different in orientation. Monarchy was led by a head of state. The common view was that God had sanctioned the Pope or King in his role as philosopher-ruler. Republic was led by elected officers who won their position through civic battle, the means of which was based on the rule of power and wealth. Despotic rulers gain power through military sanctions.

Simony and the Bishopric


Compagni wrote from a Christian perspective rather than a fully secular position. His hybrid approach displayed the fabric of both the temporal and nontemporal worldviews. Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence abounds with references to the church and metaphysical ideology. An example of a blended approach is Compagni’s comment regarding the sacred institution, “The holy Church of Rome, which is mother to Christians when wicked pastors do not lead it astray, had fallen into low esteem as the reverence of the faithful diminished.”[89] Rather than referring to the Roman Church as a temporal power or even an ecclesiastical entity alone, Compagni flavors his comments toward moral judgments of good versus bad.

His use of a maternal designation such as “mother” further emphasizes the bride of Christ being the holy Church of Rome. The Church being the bride of Christ is the mother of the spiritual family. In this circumstance, Compagni acknowledges the wickedness of the papacy that led the church astray so that those known to be faithful to the spiritual institution no longer held the church in esteem. To remedy this low point the leaders of the church summoned the Florentines together, held a court of excommunication, and pronounced judgement against them; and “excommunicated the officials, interdicted the city, and deprived laymen of the holy mass.”[90] The Florentine rulers sent ambassadors to the pope to strengthen the alliance and require assistance of the pope. Once Bishop Lottieri della Tosa died it was then that a newly appointed “bishop was named through simony: a man of low birth, zealous for the Guelf Party and beloved by the popolo, but not of holy life.”[91]

The newly appointed bishop was chosen by three criteria. He was a man of low birth in the sense of class and wealth. He was not an elite man from a noble family. He was a man of zeal for the Parte Guelfa which aligned well with the papal agenda. He was a man loved by the popolo. All in all the formula was perfect for the selection of this man as the new bishop. Even so, the Compagni text states that he was not a man who espoused the holy life. In a holy institution, the one characteristic that would likely have been assumed as necessary is the one trait that is distinctly mentioned absent della Tosa. This is his missing attribute. The decision regarding della Tosa was not based on high social status of class or wealth. The statement that he was “a man of low birth” is a hint to the “why” of his selection. Maybe he was not an astute man but he was a man whose known allegiance was to the Guelf Party. He was loved by the popolo which all lend to the idea that he was a man whose intellect would not interfere with those in power. Further, the fact that he was not a holy man is quite interesting since he was appointed to the office of bishop.

The Pope was Widely Condemned for this, Though Wrongly


Once again the papal office was used to further the political aims of those possessing temporal power. Here is the appointment to the bishopric a political man rather than a holy man. As a result: The pope was widely condemned for this, though wrongly: according to the philosopher, evil pastors are sometimes sent by God because of the sins of the people. Many people lavished promises and money on the Papal Court: some had the votes and others the money, but this man got the bishopric. One of the cathedral canons was elected bishop by the canons. Messer Rosso and the others favored him, because he was of their mind and they thought they could bend him as they wished. He went to the Papal Court and spent a lot of money, but did not get the bishopric.[92]

The question of sacred and secular is an ongoing theme in both Compagni and Bruni in varying levels of intensity. Bruni focused less on the spiritual. This is simply based on Bruni’s intended result as a historian. Bruni wrote of glorious Florence. This was his description of the greatness of Florence as the idea for others to emulate. Compagni had a distinctly different intended outcome. He set about the task of chronicling the history of Florence but with a clear weaving of the spiritual worldview into his text. Bruni did not.

The House of Brunelleschi


Compagni describes a cordial connection between Messer Betto Brunelleschi Ghibelline and Pope Boniface. He stated, Messer Betto Brunelleschi and his house were of Ghibelline stock. He was rich in land and goods. He was infamous among the popolo, for in times of famine he locked up his grain and declared: ‘Either I get this price for it or it will never be sold.’ He treated the Whites and the Ghibellines very badly, for two reasons: first, so that he might be more trusted by those who ruled; second, because he could expect no mercy for having switched sides. He was often employed on embassies since he was a good orator. He was on familiar terms with Pope Boniface. When messer Napoleone Orsini was cardinal legate in Tuscany, he was thoroughly at home with him and held him in conversation, removing any hope of making peace between the Whites and Blacks of Florence.[93]

As the protagonist of his house Messer Betto Brunelleschi was of the Ghibelline stock. Brunelleschi was wealthy in both mercantile endeavors and property. His infamy among the popolo was of note. Being a man of means he ascended to social heights allowing for power and influence among the people. Compagni illustrates his use of power and means by Brunelleschi’s choice to lock up his grain from those in need of food. Brunelleschi employed economic theories of supply and demand in his equation to the people. In short, he had grain. The people had need of the grain. Brunelleschi was unwilling to simply accept any price other than what he determined was of value for his grain. Compagni states of Brunelleschi: “Either I get this price for it or it will never be sold.”[94] It is this statement that Compagni launches his moral judgment against Brunelleschi in which he concluded, “He [Brunelleschi] treated the White and the Ghibellines very badly.…”[95] Compagni approaches his Chronicle with a religious foundation that lends itself to an altruistic mind while Bruni does so from a patriotic mind.

Conclusion


The reign of Pope Boniface VIII was marked with numerous papal agendas for the creation of empire under the name of the Holy Roman Church. This study has as the central focus key texts from Dino Compagni and Leonardo Bruni in which the two historians aggregately mention Pope Boniface VIII by his papal name, his given family name, and respectful titles such as the pope and the pontiff.[96] There is a wealth of information in these two sources to better understand matters of spiritual, civic, philosophic, political alliance and the military mind of Pope Boniface VIII. During his brief reign Pope Boniface VIII had a tremendous influence upon the course of Florentine history, made a lasting impression on the Holy Roman Church, the peninsula of Italy, the Guelf and Ghibelline factions and the birth of Renaissance.

Endnotes

[1] This study focuses on key texts from Dino Compagni and Leonardo Bruni in which the two historians mention Pope Boniface VIII by his papal name, his given family name, and respectful titles such as “the pope” and “the pontiff.” These two sources provide a wealth of information to better understand matters of spiritual, civic, philosophical, political alliance, and the military mind of Pope Boniface VIII. During his brief reign, Pope Boniface VIII had a significant influence on the birth of the Renaissance and the course of Florentine history. Compagni, Dino. Chronicle of Florence. Translated and edited by Daniel E. Bornstein. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986. Leonardo Bruni, History of the Florentine People, ed. and trans. James Hankins, I Tatti Renaissance Library, vols. 1–3 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001–2007).

[2] Alexander Clarence Flick, The Rise of the Mediaeval Church (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015), 413.

[3] Chronicle, 43.

[4] Ibid., 40.

[5] History, 4.36. In this text, Bruni describes the elevation of Boniface to the pontificate: “The Aretine exiles, having seen what the intentions of the Florentines were, entered into certain highly unfavorable agreements with the men who controlled their city. They turned over certain castles to these men but remained in exile, disappointed in their hope of return. Thus, nothing was done this year either against the Pisans, because of the despair of the exiles. Nevertheless, the year was distinguished by the election of two popes. Pope Celestine was elected by the cardinals after they had been immured for more than two years, but the man abdicated about six months later. The conclave then elevated Boniface VIII to the pontificate. Around the same time, the church of Santa Croce in Florence began building in its present form. Before that time, there had only been a narrow little chapel.”

[6] There is no apparent evidence that Bruni actually had access to the work of Compagni, although there are certain hints suggesting that Bruni referred to Compagni as a primary source. Compagni and Bruni are considered two primary sources for the study of the Italian Renaissance. Compagni authored his work nearly one hundred years before Bruni’s. While modern scholars study Compagni and Bruni as primary sources from that period, it is important to note that Compagni is not a confirmed primary source for Bruni. Compagni addresses a more condensed timeframe at the point of transition from the twelfth into the thirteenth century. Bruni, however, spans from the foundation of Rome until the early quattrocento period of the Italian Renaissance. Both historians write of Florence. Both write of timeframes in which their works overlapped. As a result, they treated similar topics, such as Pope Boniface VIII. Bruni’s crowning historical work primarily aimed to promote the glorious nature of his beloved Florence. His History chronicles the continual development of Florence’s magnificence and her ability to survive amid great trials, wars, and natural calamities. Compagni’s Chronicle is written as somewhat of a spiritual novel of a city divinely led through many dire circumstances at the turn of the century.

[7] James Burge, “Dante: Reason and Religion,” History Today 61, no. 3 (2011): 10–15. For a discussion of the commercial and institutional magnificence of church buildings, see Stephen Mark Holmes, “Reading the Church: William Durandus and a New Approach to the History of Ecclesiology,” Ecclesiology 7, no. 1 (2011): 29–49. Benedetto Caetani (December 24, 1294–October 11, 1303) served as Pope Boniface VIII (1294–1303). Pope Boniface established the first Roman Catholic Jubilee year in Rome and stated that both spiritual and temporal power were under the pope’s sovereignty. As a result, kings were subordinate to the legislative power of the Roman pontiff. Steven Gertz, “Boniface VIII,” Christian History 20, no. 2 (2001): 34. Boniface VIII is often remembered for his hostility with King Philip IV of France and with Dante Alighieri, who consigned the bishop of Rome among the simoniacs in the Eighth Circle of Hell in his Divine Comedy. J. Wetzel, “A Meditation on Hell: Lessons on Dante,” Modern Theology 18, no. 3 (2002): 375–94. See also Sandra Collins, “Inventing Hell: Dante, the Bible, and Eternal Torment,” Library Journal 139, no. 10 (2014): 111; Dante Alighieri, Paradiso, trans. Mark Musa (New York, 1986).

[8] N. P. J. Gordon, “Plotting Conflict in Florence 1300,” Renaissance Studies 24, no. 5 (2010): 621–37.

[9] History, 4.49. Year: 1300. Hans Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 46. Baron wrote of the year 1402: “At that time the role of city-state independence and liberty, in the past as well as the present, emerged in a new light.” Hans Yoran, “Florentine Civic Humanism and the Emergence of Modern Ideology,” History and Theory 46, no. 3 (2007): 326–44. Yoran wrote, “According to Baron, Petrarchean humanism of the fourteenth century was a nostalgic classicist literary movement steeped in medieval notions, most notably adherence to the ideal of the vita contemplativa.” See, for example, Albert Rabil Jr., ed., Renaissance Humanism: Foundations, Forms, and Legacy, vol. II, Humanism Beyond Italy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988), 152–54. For discussion of Renaissance art during the Great Schism, see Carol Richardson, “St Joseph, St Peter, Jean Gerson and the Guelphs,” Renaissance Studies 26, no. 2 (2012): 243–68.

[10] History, 4.49.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] John M. Najemy, “Guild Republicanism in Trecento Florence: The Successes and Ultimate Failure of Corporate Politics,” American Historical Review 84, no. 1 (1979): 53–72; Carol Quillen, “The Uses of the Past in Quattrocento Florence: A Reading of Leonardo Bruni’s Dialogues,” Journal of the History of Ideas 71, no. 3 (2010): 363–85.

[15] History, 4.49.

[16] Ibid. Bruni rarely used medical terminology in the three volumes of his History; however, he chose the term “disease” to describe the potential for further war arising from serious conflict. There is, of course, the potential of interpreting Bruni’s use of the word “disease” as a literal medical condition that fell upon the comune. This is not a likely or viable interpretation. More likely, disease may be interpreted as dis-ease, or not at ease (i.e., tension). Bruni intended to communicate that a disease with the capacity to spread into the depth of the comune was the concern of the leaders of the Guelf Party. The use of the words “now burst into open” lends itself to this interpretation.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Giannozzo Manetti, Biographical Writings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 25; Joel Schorn, “Who Are the Doctors of the Church?,” U.S. Catholic 77, no. 9 (2012): 46. “The church did not get around to proclaiming doctors until the 13th century when Pope Boniface VIII named the original four: Saints Ambrose (340–397 A.D.), Jerome (345–420 A.D.), and Pope Gregory the Great (540–604 A.D.).”

[20] History, 4.49.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007). This is not the use of the term “secular” in the sense of Charles Taylor in his work A Secular Age.

[23] Gene A. Brucker, Florentine Politics and Society, 1343–1378 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962).

[24] Writings, 25.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Mediaeval Church, 413.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Bruni, History, 1.80.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid., 4.62.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Chronicle, 16.

[36] Use of the term “comital” referring to the count or earl.

[37] Use of the term “fief” referring to a feudal estate.

[38] Use of the term “conjugal” referring to marriage.

[39] Theodore Evergates, The Aristocracy in the County of Champagne, 1100–1300 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007); David d’Avray, Papacy, Monarchy and Marriage 860–1600 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[40] History, 4.44.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Masonic oral tradition holds that Jean de Chalon was a Knight Templar.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Chronicle, 20.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid., 24.

[51] Ibid., 41.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid.

[54] History, 4.51.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid., 4.59.

[57] Ibid., 33–34.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid., 40.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid., 41.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid., 50.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid., 52.

[70] Ibid., 55.

[71] “The Whites went to Arezzo, where the podestà was Uguccione della Faggiuola, an old Ghibelline who had risen from humble origins. This man was corrupted by the vain hope that Pope Boniface would make his son a cardinal, and at the pope’s request he treated the Whites so badly that they had to leave. A good part of them went to Forlì, where the vicar for the Church was Scarpetta degli Ordelaffi, a nobleman from Forlì.”

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid., 60–61.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid., 75.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Ibid.

[79] “Appraisal judgment” is defined as a statement of opinion pertaining to the value or importance of an event in history. Bruni offers frequent appraisal judgments that result in value based upon his life’s abounding experiences. The following year was 1294. Bruni has full historical narrative for the years before and after the year in question.

[80] History, 4.39. Bruni often comments on historical events with thoughts such as “seems important to me,” “in my opinion,” “it appears,” “what has been said so far is more than enough,” “my belief is,” and “I find that.” See History, 1.4; 1.38; 2.117; 2.121; and 3.23, respectively.

[81] History, 4.39.

[82] Ibid.

[83] History, 4.36. Battle strategy employs the question of continued aggression for total destruction of the power base of the enemy balanced with the decision to accept victory while seizing control of the power and wealth of the opposing government.

[84] Ibid.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Ibid. Note that “it was further specified that this magistrate was not to be someone who had been condemned, exiled, or expelled from one of these cities or towns.”

[87] Ibid. The idea of “perpetual immunity from taxation” displays the cunning and precision of the Florentine negotiation. Given the value of export and import to the Republic of Florence, this term alone had substantial influence on the wealth creation of Florence and was a significant financial injunction against Pisa—albeit a high price to pay to avoid destruction. Also note the additional term: “If Guelfo and Lotto, the sons of Count Ugolino (the man the Pisans had starved to death) wish to enter into this pact, they were to be allowed to do so for a period of six months; if they did so, they were to be granted the same terms as Judge Ugolino of Gallura and the members of his faction with respect to restoration to the city and to the freeing of hostages, as specified above.”

[88] Ibid. See Bruni’s comments in History, 4.38: “Thus two ambassadors were sent out, Ruggeri d’Ugo degli Albizzi and Cambio d’Aldobrandino Bellincioni. They were instructed to go to Pisa and request that the terms of the treaty be fulfilled. Only when they had been fully carried out would Pecciole be turned over to them. They should also extract a promise from the Pisans that the inhabitants of that castle should be well treated and not suffer mischief because they had favored the cause of the Florentines and their allies in the late war. The ambassadors, having gone to Pisa and presented their commission, were able to convince the Pisans to fulfill the terms of the treaty. Thus, shortly thereafter, they reported back by letter that there had been a proclamation opening Pisa to the exiles; that the walls and towers at Pontedera had mostly been demolished, and that the rest of the demolition work was proceeding apace; and that all the other conditions had been fulfilled, except that the hostages had not yet been released; but it had been agreed that once the hostages had been moved to Pontedera and handed over, the Florentines themselves would turn over Pecciole within eight days, or the hostages would be released at Pecciole.”

[89] Ibid.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Chronicle, 85.

[93] Ibid., 99.

[94] Ibid.

[95] Ibid.

[96] Dino Compagni, Chronicle of Florence, trans. Daniel Bornstein (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 16. Estimated timeframe circa 1280–1310; Leonardo Bruni, History of the Florentine People (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

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