A Study of Venice Through the Eyes of Leonardo Bruni

Leonardo Bruni's "History of the Florentine People" is the story of republican glory.  The History is a tome of nostalgia written by an aged man whose life was wholly given to the development of his beloved Florence.  His narrative was an attempt to promote the future development of the republic.  Perfectly centered in the heart of Etruscan geography, Florence became the eye of the storm for the rebirth of man, or renaissance.  Intent on the glory of Florence he displayed the story of the republic Florentine battle with incidental references to the civic, republic, and constitution weaving those concepts of civil order into his narrative.^[1]

Contextually, there were five seats of power within the Italian Peninsula^[2] of the trecento and quattrocento Renaissance.  Two republics- Florence and Venice;^[3] two monarchical governments- Kingdom of Naples and the Pontifical State; and one tyranny- Milan.  All other centers of population within the Peninsula gravitated to these five locations and three forms of government.

Note. In Figure 1, chords indicate relationships between states; line style encodes type. Node colors mirror each state’s role, with Venice highlighted as the anchor. This diagram underscores Venice’s role as the central reference point, positioned as the anchor from which all arcs extend. The curved lines map bilateral relations: blue for allies, burgundy for adversaries, gold dashed for unstable or mixed ties, and gray dotted for neutrality. Reading across, Florence aligns with Venice yet clashes with Milan and maintains unstable ties with the Papacy and Naples. Naples, by contrast, is neutral toward Venice and Milan, allied with the Papacy, and mixed with Florence. The overlapping arcs highlight how Venice functioned as both participant and arbiter within a volatile network of alliances and conflicts, visually reinforcing the Venetian-centered perspective of the analysis.

Within this frame of mind the reader sees the interplay of constituencies throughout the History.  Milan was continually at odds with the republics of Florence and Venice.  Theirs was a conflict of philosophical orientation of government function in the civil order.  The Kingdom of Naples and the Pontifical State were invariably at odds with many entities within the societal order.  At odds, primarily, on questions of ecclesial authority and, secondarily, the pursuit of papal empire.  Allies of the papal state and constituencies monarchical of the Peninsula supported the form of monarchical government established in Rome as the pontiff directed.   The Guelphs endorsed the monarchical state of Roman and Neapolitan government .  The Ghibellines supported the northern Frankish government as invaders of the Peninsula.  A The Franks were at odds with the Roman state.  A breeding ground of conflict emanated from the Florentine republic as the struggle for stability was never fully secure during most of the Renaissance period.  Within this context the name “Venice” is mentioned throughout the three volume work of Bruni.  This research essay is designed to exegete key texts specifically mentioning "Venice" within the History.

Figure 2 illustrates key episodes in Bruni’s account that specifically reference Venice, providing a concise overview of their shifting roles in the balance of power across the Italian peninsula.

Venice:  Pre-Renaissance  

In B.C. 67 the “Etruscans crossed the Apennines” subduing in war and occupying “every place on this side of the Po, and later the whole region on the other side up to the Alps, except the farthest promontory held by the Venetians.”^[4]  The Etruscans were an ancient people who lived in the area known today as Tuscany.  The Etruscans were on the offensive throughout the region with the intent to engage war and occupy territory. As a long term strategy the Venetians were intent on holding their own territory.  These respective behaviors are further developed as each group matures in the civic mind.  

The term "promontory" references a high point of land extending out into the water. The first introduction to the Venetians reveals a defensive posture.  The Etruscan military moved with great force subduing all in her path crossing the Apennines and rounding the Alps, conducting war, and conquering all with the exception of what was held by the Venetians.  Venetian history navigates a small set of study of leveraging the sea and islands.  Seas posing serious limitations to the less innovative mind.  However, Venice became adept at dominating the sea and the islands that accompany the great water mass.  The Venetians expanded domain while engaging island and sea resources,^[5] leveraging land resources, and keeping what was theirs by reason of victory.  Ultimately, an agile force to be dealt with in the Renaissance.  Whether protecting their own promontory defense position or conquering islands along the Adriatic Sea the Venetians were a resilient empire with which to reckon.

Nearly 500 years later another glimpse of Venice.  Here a window opens to display another form of offensive arose against Venice- disease in the form of disease.  Bruni recorded, “Venice and the cities of northern Italy had been afflicted by the Gothic scourge and further weakened by the recent plague.”^[6]  The “gothic scourge” is a reference to the smallpox plague in France and Italy.  This period in history was marked with war and pestilence.  Of these two issues war was both the tragedy and progress of man.  War was controlled by man representing the horrors that men impose upon one another.  Famine and pestilence are issues of force majeure.  Man had limited ability to control the natural occurrence of famine and pestilence on society.  Venice in her resilience withstood both the attacks of man, disease and other difficulties facing humanity.  Not only were the Venetians required to navigate war they were required to navigate disease.

Venice: Early Renaissance

Bruni first mentioned Renaissance Venice in the context of Renaissance in the year 1309.  Generally, the early Renaissance is noted as approximately A.D. 1250.  This particular trecento text is nearly 70 years into Renaissance. Thus, we are introduced to Renaissance Venice in conflict with the Pontifical State.  This, “in this same period the Florentines^[7] sent mounted auxiliaries to the papal legate^[8] who was waging war against the Venetians.”^[9]  This text highlights to the reader the important idea of the established relationship between Venice and Florence.  The papacy had engaged war against Venice.  Florentine auxiliaries served as ambassadors for Venice to seek a peaceful resolution between the Venetian people and the papacy.  The Venetians engaged ambassadors from Florence to bridge the conflict those of .  Bruni admitted, “I have not been able to ascertain whether they did this at his request or of their own accord, in order to promote reconciliations and gain favor.”^[10]  Even Bruni being only 100 years removed from the event admits uncertainty as to the Florentine motive for mediating on behalf of the Venetians.  

He stated, “In any case that legate, after beating the Venetians in a great battle, recognized this generous act, lifted the interdict and restored the sacraments to the city.  In this way the city was at last reconciled and returned to favor.”^[11]  Most references to Venice is of the victories Venice. Yet, our first introduction in the Renaissance is of the defeated Venice. The Venetians were often out of favor with the papacy due to their disregard for papal edict.  The resulting judgement against Venice was interdict and removal of the sacraments from the people.  In effect, this was both a civil (interdict) and religious (sacrament) exile of an entire nation of people.  The Venetians were singular in focus. That focus was for the financial strength of the republic.  Venetian history is one of innovation toward serving the interests of Venice above the interests of allies and foes. While Venice was at odds with the Pontifical State more often than not they remained in good favor with Florence.

A quarter of a century later^[12] the city of Florence looked to the Venetians imploring them to join “in a military alliance” against their neighboring tyrant.  The Florentine leadership knew the Venetians “had been harmed by him to some extent and were hostile to his power.”  After much persuasive discussion “the Venetians finally agreed to join them in a military alliance.”^[13]  Together, the Florentine and Venetian allies “started a war against the tyrant, beginning with the territory of Treviso.”^[14]  As the synergy of war escalated Treviso “turned to the Florentines and Venetians and were accepted into the league.”^[15]  Eventually, “the tyrant’s garrison was crushed by the Paduans, and the tyrant himself was caught and sent to Venice.”^[16]  

Often a series of unfortunate events tend to upset the momentum of alliance.  The upset in this instance was the death of heroes.  The death of republic heroes “profoundly upset the Florentines and Venetians, and both cities paid them great honor, for it was held that the war had mostly been won through their courage and ability.”^[17]  The Florentine and Venetian national fervor was one of honor and respect for those who led through great courage.  Injured soldiers and the death of leaders tend to invigorate nationalistic morale in favor of the glory of republic.^[18]. Note the combined delineation of "their troops" denoting a unified body. 

Table 1 illustrates pivotal episodes of conflict and cooperation between Venice and Florence. These must be understood within the wider diplomatic context of the Italian peninsula, where shifting alliances determined the balance of power. Bruni presents Venice as a central actor, shaping regional stability through alliance and enmity. Table 1 presents these dynamics in matrix form, placing Venice at the center and tracing its relationships with Florence, Milan, the Papacy, and Naples.

Note. This matrix illustrates Venice’s position as the central reference point in the network of Italian alliances and conflicts during the late medieval period. Venice is shown in both the header row and the leftmost column to emphasize its anchoring role. To read the table: select a row to see that polity’s relationships with the others listed across the top. For example, looking across Florence’s row shows that Florence is allied with Venice, in enmity with Milan, in a mixed relationship with the Papacy, and likewise in a mixed relationship with Naples. Similarly, Naples is mixed with Florence, neutral with Venice and Milan, and allied with the Papacy. Each cell marks the prevailing diplomatic orientation, with colors reinforcing distinctions: blue (ally), burgundy (enemy), gold (mixed/unstable), and gray (neutral). The matrix highlights how Venice and its neighbors navigated shifting rivalries while balancing alliances across the peninsula’s volatile political landscape.

The following excerpt provided in full is representative of the nature of Venetian interplay with foes and allies alike.  Of note is the constant theme of peace in the work of the Venetians.  Bruni wrote,

Mastino, seeing his power slipping away, with his brother captured, four large cities with many of their towns lost, and neighboring Vicenza placed in peril, now lost his self-confidence and sent ambassadors to Venice to make peace.  The Venetians for their part were inclined to peace, and Mastino’s public entreaty and private friendships with many Venetians were further inducements.  So the Venetians in the end gave him peace on condition that he should give up Treviso and its territory to them.  For the Florentines the only assurances given were that, if they too wished to join the peace, they might receive Pescia and Buggiano from the enemy and keep the other castles they possessed in Lucchese territory; the Lucchese exiles who had fought alongside the Florentines and Venetians in the war would get the right to return to the city of Lucca.^[19]  

The Venetians were the de facto negotiators of terms for peace.  Terms were often negotiated secretly behind closed doors.  Once agreed upon the Venetians embraced a take it or leave it perspective toward the issue at hand.  Venice negotiated terms communicating to Florence that if they wanted peace they could accept the terms.  If they preferred war then so be it.  Of interest is that the Venetians do not appear to have taken an emotional stand.  Note the posture of Venice,

These conditions being secretly arranged, the Venetians sent envoys to Florence stating their own desire for peace and laying out the terms; if the Florentines wanted peace, they could have it on the these terms; if they preferred war, that too was their decision.  This act on the part of the Venetians seemed a very serious matter to the Florentine People, but necessity itself required them to be careful in their choices.”^[20]

Further,

The latter view finally prevailed, and they sent envoys to Venice with instructions to condemn the peace in the strongest terms and to try to change the Venetians’ minds; but if the latter should persist in their decision, they should improve the therms as much as possible and finally accept the offered peace.  The envoys were Francesco de’ Pazzi, Alessio de’ Rinucci, and Jacopo degli Alberti.  These envoys got nothing, as the minds of the Venetians were made up with regard to the peace.  So the peace was finally accepted on the same terms which had been agreed upon earlier.^[21]In A.D. 1354 the Florentines and Venetians made peace with the Genoese,^[22] who were worn by “a long and bitter war with the Venetians and Catalans,^[23] [who] finally took refuge with the archbishop of Milan, handing him the lordship over their city.”^[24]

During the same year the Venetians stood bond for the payment to ensure the success of the peace accord. Bruni noted, 

Ambassadors sent to Genoa calmed a controversy whose very nature was as follows.  When the Venetians were making peace after their recent great war, they promised among other things to release the island of Tenedos, the occupation of which had started the war.  A forfeit of 150,000 florins was fixed for this purpose.  At the request of the Venetians the Florentines had stood bond for the payment.  When Tenedos was not returned, all goods of Florentine citizens in Genoa or in places under control of the Genoese were immediately seized.  The Venetians, under compulsion from the Florentines, told the Genoese that it hadn’t been their fault that Tenedos had not been surrendered; it had happened because of the obstinacy of its governor.  Since it appeared the Venetians were quibbling about words rather than offering material satisfaction, grounds for the grievance and anger were created.  The matter was patched up as best it might be with the Genoese; and ambassadors were sent to Venetians to remonstrate with them.^[25]

Peace negotiations among opposing armies were conducted by envoys. In this text the envoys had been sent out on multiple occasions to negotiate peace at Imola. Envoys representing the Pontifical State and the Venetians acted as mediators and arbitrators. The negotiations were transferred from Imola to Venice thus shifting the center of gravity for the discussions. “Men were hoping for a great deal from this negotiation, especially as the Venetians seemed to be striving for peace in their interest as well.”^[26]

Gian Galeazzo

The Venetians who, in characteristic style, hosted negotiations for peace saw that “Gian Galeazzo^[27] of Milan^[28] was standing in the way of achieving a fair peace, and fearing his propinquity and excessive power, themselves joined the confederation of the Florentines and her allies.”  The Venetians are positioned in the History as those who first sought peace in the Peninsula.  

Yet, the Venetians being men of war astutely judged conflicting situations that posed threat to the Republic of Venice.  Recognizing that Gian Galeazzo was a hindrance to peace, that he was in close proximity (propinquity), and that he possessed excessive power, the Venetians “joined in the confederation of the Florentines and her allies.”  The Venetians sent their envoys to Gian Galeazzo beseeching him to cease the war and notifying of their intent to join the war to protect the prince of Mantua.  

The Venetian decision to join the confederation shifted the imbalance of power in favor of the confederation.  Bruni notes, “Gian Galeazzo was terrified by this act of the Venetians, fearing that if the Venetians too joined the war, he would find himself greatly outnumbered.”^[29]

The following text provides testimony to the Venetian influence in the peninsula since once again they are noted as receivers of complaints, guarantors of armistice, and the enforcement of the suspension of hostilities. 

Both parties [who; is this the opposing foes; or parties together against the foe?] were complaining incessantly about these issues to the Venetians, who were the guarantors of the armistice, and they eventually cause the latter, overcome with boredom and weariness, to take the view that it would suffice if there were no violations of the truce with Lombardy; if there were some in Tuscany, they didn’t seem much to care.”^[30]

The orator proposed,

‘My view is that an embassy consisting of men distinguished for their practical wisdom should be sent to the Venetians to explain to them the extent and nature of Gian Galeazzo’s undertakings throughout Tuscany; how he gets control of place after place and is proceeding to hem us in and surround us.  When the envoys have explained this, leaving them as nothing of the Venetians, so as not to lessen the prestige of our city, but let them instruct the Venetians with word and argument that these dangers pertain to them no less than to us.’^[31]

In a final word of warning, “the Venetians should reflect whether it is to their advantage to block his designs now, or wait so that he can tear the members of the alliance apart at his leisure, without any impediment, especially since these designs are contrary to the armistice and peace which he himself made with all of Tuscany.”^[32]

Venice: Transition to the Quattrocento

As the century transitions from trecento to quattrocento the central focus of Florence is the Milanese war.  The Florentines came to terms with emperor under condition that he promise to make no peace, armistice, nor accord with Milan “except at the request and with the consent of the Florentine People; the latter would in the meantime make every effort to get the pope and the Venetians to join him- something, they said, which would not be difficult if the war went well.”^[33]

However, the negotiation failed due to issues regarding payment for the emperor’s services.  Bruni notes, 

After nearly a month had been wasted with quarrels of this kind and he had received a firm refusal about paying the money, the emperor wax indignant and decided to leave.  Sending his cavalry ahead by land to Treviso, he himself travelled to Venice for the sake of seeing this marvelous city and reconciling it to himself if he could.  The Venetians received him with great magnificence, showering him with all the honors customarily paid to emperors.^[34]

Two Florentine envoys, Filippo Corsini and Rinaldo Gianfigliazzi, traveled with the emperor to Venice.  These two were noted by Bruni as “prudent and well-conducted men, who had come to Venice in the emperor’s train for this reason.”  The emperor contented that the Florentines promised him money, but were in default of the arrangement.  Further, he desired the Venetians engage in the conversation to “attend to the manner in which it had been promised, for therein they might judge the justice or injustice of the complaint.”^[35]

The Venetians approved of the city’s decision thus urging harmony for the good of all parties.  Since harmony was impossible, the emperor departed sailing one day to Ciavoli.   Recognizing the need for harmony between the emperor and the two republics the Venetians redoubled their efforts and finally succeeded in bringing it about that the Florentine envoys should make another approach to him.  When they had done this, distinguished men were sent to the emperor to escort him back to Venice.  He now received money and recalled his cavalry, and after a few days stay in Venice he returned to Padua with better hope.

In a conciliatory approach the Florentines requested the emperor return in exchange for payment of the monies promised.  Upon agreement to return “distinguished men were sent to the emperor to escort him back to Venice.”  Now in a position of entrenched power the emperor 

wasted the rest of the winter in that city, keeping everyone in suspense as to whether he would go to Rome.  In the end, however, when neither the pope nor the Venetians would openly support him or give him aid, and the Florentines were requesting him to do things that looked hard to do, he decided to put off his enterprise to another time.  Thus in the month of April he left Padua and set off swiftly across the Alps.^[36]

The Venetians acted as mediator in the peace accord discussions.  Milan sent envoys to Venice “to register an accusation and complaint against the Florentines.  After hearing the Milanese envoys the Venetians summoned the Florentine envoys who were in Venice reporting everything to them and offered “an opportunity to respond if they wished.”  Bruni appended “the objections of our adversaries and the responses made to them, so that readers can weigh the justice of the case.  So the Milanese envoys were brought in by the Venetians and made a speech like the following against the Florentines.”^[37]

The Milanese envoy speech reveals key tenets of negotiation between tyrants and republicans.  Further, the terms reveal features of the cultural history of the people of the trecento.  

‘We were sent to you, O Venetians, for three reasons.  One was to register a complaint about the violation of the peace against good faith; the second, to request the penalty for violators stipulated in the agreement; and the third, to not take you by surprise if we shall resist by war those who have violated the peace.  The first embraces honor; the second, justice; the third, necessity.’  The envoys of the Duke of Milan ended with these words.^[38]

The Milanese envoy understood that the Venetian-Florentine alliance called for the Venetian to control the terms of peace.  After hearing the speeches and responses of the Milanese “the Venetians strongly endorsed the Florentine envoys, and since they thought they had given satisfaction to the honor of the city, they themselves, acting as neutrals, tried to soften their wrath with grave and prudent words.”^[39]

The Milanese argued that since the Florentines had acted in bad faith they were registering with Venice the matter and requesting penalty against the Florentines as defined in the peace treaty.  Further, that the Venetians should not be taken by surprise if the Milanese respond with military action against Florences for the breach of the agreement.  To conclude the Milanese, according to Bruni, stated the reason underpinning their decision.  The first matter of registering the breach of the peace treaty as a matter of honor.  The second matter of requesting penalty against Florence was a matter of justice.  The third matter of alerting Venice to the possibility of military attack against Florence as a matter of necessity. 

The idea of Florentine alliance with Venice is a recurring motif in Bruni’s History.  Much was required in strategic thinking of how to preserve and mature the republic. 

Bruni wrote, 

Regarding remedies for the wider perils, however, the two most effective ones that emerged from their discussions were to involve the pope in the war, or to involve the Venetians.  There was certainly some foundation for these hopes, for it was no secret that the Roman pontiff had taken ill the occupation of Perugia and Bologna, and the Venetians had long shown that they did not like the growth of the Milanese power.  An alliance was therefore sought with both with the utmost effort and zeal.  But both stopped short of committing themselves, as though dreading to join the war.  The Venetians as least demanded quite unfair terms, so that war would be fought more at Florentine than a Venetian expense, but it would be entirely the decision of the Venetians to make peace whenever they wanted, without the consent of the Florentines.  These seemed hard terms indeed, and ill-suited to the dignity of the Florentine People.  

The question of whether to involve the pope or the Venetians was an important strategic consideration.  The Pontifical State and the Venetian Republic were not on amenable terms at this point.  Recall that the Pontifical State was a monarchical form of government while the Venetian’s employed a republican form of government. The Pontifical State was founded upon principles of Christian faith coupled with empire while Venice relentless in pursuit of wealth and power.  Venice was commercially inclined toward the letter of the contractual agreement. 

The choice of alliance was not simply the decision of power alignment for the then present conflict but was tantamount to the destiny of the Florentine republic. The pope was not happy with the occupation of Perugia and Bologna as these signaled loss of papal territory.  However, the Venetians “did not like the growth of Milanese power.”  The distinction is important in understanding the power structure on the peninsula during the emergence of renaissance humanism and to gain a clearer picture of the strategic prowess of the negotiators of this period.

Admirably, the Florentines diligently sought alliance with both powers; yet, both powers stopped prior agreement in dread of war.  This brief comment in Bruni’s text makes the reader aware of the essence of power the Milanese tyranny exerted on the peninsula.  Consider that both the pontifical state and the Venetian naval empire dreaded to join the war.  Without the pontifical state the Venetians were the nation of hope.  The Venetians being risk tolerant on their own agendas and extremely difficult negotiators the Florentines received an offer of support on risk averse terms.  Bruni, in fact, concluded that the terms were “quite unfair.” 

The Venetians offered to join the alliance and engage war but at the expense of the Florentines.  Rather than establish an alliance to pool resources- people, equipment, and monies- the Venetians shifted the burden of obligation economically to the Florentine people.  In other words, the threat at hand was primarily to the Florentines who were instigating the idea of alliance.  Although the risk of Milanese attack was a serious threat to the Pontifical State and the Venetian Republic the heightened risk was directed at the Florentine Republic. The Venetians being the good business people that they were defined two terms:  the expense of war was to be the burden of Florence and the Venetians had the authority to negotiated peace rather than the Florentines.  Notably, the Florentines pay for the war and the Venetians control the war peace terms for the alliance without consent of the Florentines.  Of course, Bruni being a Florentine interpreted these as hard terms.  The Venetians considered these terms as risk mitigation tactics. Bruni in characteristic form of his “glory of Florence” motif concluded that the terms were “ill-suited to the dignity of the Florentine People.”

Amid the negotiation with the papal state and Venice the 

hope of peace supervened.  For the enemy, after capturing Bologna, seemed to wish for peace, and for this reason sent envoys to Venice, offering very fair terms.  When the Florentines heard them they feared deception and fraud.  Nevertheless, it was decided to accept peace and confederation, for they thought if a peace and an alliance were initiated at the same time, the peace would be more durable; and they reckoned this was not much to ask of the Venetians, once peace had been made.  Thus they instructed their envoys that, after adding a few corrections, they might sign a peace with the enemy and a treaty of alliance with the Venetians.^[40]

The Milanese sent envoys to Venice offering “very fair terms” for peace.  Recall the Venetians supported the war on terms that they had the sole power to negotiate terms of peace without input from the Florentines.  The Milanese appear to have been aware of this term since in their desire for peace after having conquered Bologna offered terms for peace with Venice and by default Florence. The Florentines were skeptical of the Milanese but to no avail.  The Venetians accepted terms of peace and confederation with the Milanese.  After corrections of a few terms the Florentines accepted a peace with Milan and a treaty with Venice and Milan.  

Nothing shifts battle more than the death of a key character in the story.  News arrived of Gian Galeazzo’s death.  His death was crucial to the future of all negotiations and war.  In effect, the Milanese war ended with the death of the tyrant.  

At first disbelief pervaded the minds of interested participants in the conflict. “His death was first announced by Paolo Guinigi, the lord of the Lucchesi, and was not at first certain; then the news was confirmed again, though from secret sources.”  Immediately, the envoys in Venice for negotiation were “instructed not to agree to either the peace treaty or the alliance.  The Venetians first learned of Gian Galeazzo’s death from the Florentine envoys, as they had heard nothing of it previously.”^[41]

Memoirs

As we conclude the study of Bruni’s three volume History the final review is off the “Memoirs” contained in volume three.  Whereas the three volume History officially ends in the year 1402 the “Memoirs” chronicle an additional forty-two years ending in 1444.  

The following text reveals much of the power of Venice during the era of Milanese tyranny.  Even in Bruni’s continued glory of Florence narrative he recognizes the dire situation facing the citizens if Milan were to attack Florence.  Florence without additional military strength was subject to destruction.  Thus, Bruni states,

So we Florentines had good reason to be afraid, and we began to set our sights on Venice, reckoning that they also would fear the increasing might of Milan.  Our conjectures were correct.  Venice was in fact alarmed and took a grave view of the Milanese advance towards their city.  So with good reason they were inclined to favor an alliance.  Filippo, when he realised what was afoot, to avoid a coalition between these two cities, offered peace to the Florentines, but an alliance with Venice was preferred to a peace which did not command much confidence.^[42]

Whether a real or imagined threat Bruni communicates that Milan’s strength was not only a concern to Florence but correctly reckoned that the leadership of Venice would fear the increasing strength of Milan.  In fact, Milan was deeply alarmed at the possibility of onslaught by Milan on Venice.  The two republics formed an alliance in an effort to secure the safety of the republic.

Filippo of Milan recognized the threat to his plans.  Filippo’s objective was to avoid a coalition between the two republics.  Of note is how he handled Florence and Venice; he sued for peace with Florence and requested alliance with Venice. Filippo was intent on attacking Florence as the center of the Tuscan landscape.  To conquer Florence in is much like the conquering of Constantinople years early by Venice.  To hold Florence was to hold the center of the Peninsula. To align with Venice is to secure the economic and military power to accomplish the successful campaign against Florence.  Thus, for Filippo the preference was peace with Florence and alliance with Venice.

To better grasp the contrast Bruni highlights between the republics of Florence and Venice and the tyranny of Milan, it is useful to set their respective political forms, strategies, and outcomes side by side. The following table distills these dynamics into a clear comparative frame.

Note. Table 3 contrasts the differing political forms and strategies of Florence, Venice, and Milan as presented in Bruni’s “Memoirs,” highlighting how republican and tyrannical powers pursued alliances and war during the early Quattrocento.

This Bruni text highlights yet another significant look at the power of Venice during the Renaissance.  Both republic and tyranny seek alliance with Venice.  The power of Venice was unmatched at this point in the history of the Peninsula.

The emergence of Venice within the context of the History is a story alliance between two republican powers- Florence and Venice.  A new alliance formed for the purpose of attacking the city of Brescia.  The aggressive movement of the alliance alarmed the Milanese leadership who quickly pulled back from Tuscany.  Bruni comments, 

the Venetians at once attacked the city of Brescia.  Milan was alarmed and immediately recalled her forces from Tuscany.  Florence divided her forces from Tuscany.  Florence divided its forces in two.  They sent one part to Lombardy, to be joined by the Venetians, and the other part they reserved for recovering the castles which had been lost in the territory of Arezzo.  These castles were recovered with some difficulty.  In Lombardy the war went well.  Brescia, with all its fortresses, fell to the might of the Venetians.  A peace was then concluded with Milan whereby Bergamo and some other towns were surrendered to Venice.^[43]

Once Milan retreated the alliance strategically sent one part to Lombardy to further the pursuit of domination in war while another part was sent to ensure the recovery of castles in Arezzo that had been lost in battle.  Eventually, Milan surrendered and a peace treaty was concluded.

Conclusion

The Venetians were a naval empire with emphasis on the east for the purpose of securing of riches.  They spent many years seeking methods of conquering the waterways leading to treasures spoken of since the early days of mankind.  These naval journeys harden a once island dwelling group of men into barbaric soldiers with only the idea of conquering in ruthless warlike spirit to take lands, to secure the riches and own what was theirs through the wars in which they engaged.  They were drawn into the conflicts of the Peninsula due to their prowess in the sea.  Eventually, the Venetians became known as great negotiators.  Due to their power they were often called upon to seek peace among foes and to be the judiciary for conflicting agendas among these enemies.

Bruni chronicled the glory of Florence as a republic seeking civic order.  The Florentines often called upon the Venetians for military power, financial support, and strength of morale.  While Bruni was Florentine at his core he inadvertently promoted the Venetians as a power to be reckoned with both on land and sea.

References

^[1] The work of Leonardo Bruni is the chronicle of the lives of the people of Tuscany, of the Florentines, and the Guelf and Ghibelline factions.  In preparation for this essay the author has read the entirety of Leonardo Bruni’s three volume work entitled “History of the Florentine People.”  Dr. James Hankins prepared these volumes as a contribution to The I Tatti Renaissance Library published by Harvard University Press.­  The I Tatti series provides access to literary, historical, philosophical, theological, and scientific works originally written in Latin now available in English.

^[2] Biondo Flavio, Italy Illuminated (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2005).  Brotton developed an excellent resource of maps reflecting the geographical design of the great maps.  Of note in Brotton’s work are the Venetian maps.  Jerry Brotton, Great Maps (New York, NY: DK ADULT, 2014), 

^[3] Elizabeth Horodowich, Venice: a New History of the City and Its People (Philadelphia, PA: Running Press Book Publishers, 2009).  Alethea Wiel, A History of Venice: from Its Founding to the Unification of Italy (New York: Barnes & Noble Inc, 1997).  Professor Frederic Chapin Lane, Venice and History: the Collected Papers of Frederic C. Lane (Baltimore, MD:  The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966).  Thomas Madden, Venice: a New History of the City and Its People (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2012).  Paul Strathern, The Venetians: a New History: from Marco Polo to Casanova (New York, NY: Pegasus, 2014).  John Ruskin, The Stones of Venice, 2nd ed. (London: The Folio Society, 2001).  Pietro Bembo, History of Venice, Volume 1-3 (The i Tatti Renaissance Library), 1St ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).  Horodowich, Wiel, Lane, Madden, and Strathern provide detail into the city of Venice within a broader cultural historical perspective.  Ruskin describes the history of Venetian architecture.  Bembo is the history of the era who lived in the late Renaissance.

^[4] Leonardo Bruni, History of the Florentine People (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 1:21.

^[5] The Battle of Lepanto, trans. Elizabeth Wright et al. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).  Roger Crowley, City of Fortune: How Venice Ruled the Seas, Reprint ed. (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2013).  Roger Crowley, Empires of the Sea: the Siege of Malta, the Battle of Lepanto, and the Contest for the Center of the World (New York, NY: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2009).  Wright served as editor of the I Tatti work translating the poems regarding the battle of Lepanto the great turning point in the history of Venetian maritime power.  Crowley authored two outstanding works on the sea power of Venice.

^[6] Ibid., 1:83.  Tran Thi-Nguyen-Ny et al., “High Throughput, Multiplexed Pathogen Detection Authenticates Plague Waves in Medieval Venice, Italy,” Plos ONE 6, no. 3 (2011): 1-5.  Scientific discovery verifies the smallpox plague that took place in Venice, Italy.

^[7] Stephen Bowd, “The Republic of Ideas: Venice, Florence and the Defence of Liberty, 1525-1530,” History 85, no. 279 (2000): 404-28.  Gene Brucker, review of Tales of Two Cities: Florence and Venice in the Renaissance, American Historical Review 88, no. 3 (83): 599-617.  Anthony Brandt, “Rome Ravaged,” Military History 30, no. 2 (2013): 60-67.  The work of Bowd, Brucker, and Brandt underscore the deep relationship between Florence and Venice.

^[8] Christian Chenu, “Innocent III and the Case for War in Southern France in 1207,” Journal of Religious History 35, no. 4 (2011): 507-15. N.P.J. Gordon, “Plotting Conflict in Florence 1300,” Renaissance Studies 24, no. 5 (2010): 621-37.  The conflict between the Romish constituency and surrounding peoples was in a continual state of flux.  Much depended on the political orientation of each pontiff as he acceded into power.

^[9] Bruni, History, 1:459.

^[10] Ibid.

^[11] Ibid.

^[12] This was the year 1336.  Bruni referred to the twenty-five year span as “at length.”

^[13] Ibid., 2:211; 2:213. 

^[14] Ibid.  James Shaw, review of Civic Christianity in Renaissance Italy: The Hospital of Treviso, 1400–1530., History 93, no. 311 (2008): 422-23.  Shaw offers insight into the cultural history of Treviso in the midst of war.  Also, of note are the mythical views of Venice and questions of power and pleasure.  Robert Finley, “The Immortal Republic: The Myth of Venice During the Italian Wars (1494-1530),” Sixteenth Century Journal 30, no. 4 (1999).

Greg Burke, “Masters of Power and Pleasure,” Time Europe 157, no. 6 (2001): 1-54.

^[15] Bruni, History, 2:213.

^[16] Ibid., 2:237.

^[17] Ibid.

^[18] Ibid., 2:239.  Bruni noted, “The following year the Florentines and Venetians brought their troops into Veronese territory, making camp not far from the city.”  Buonanno, Lorenzo. Review of Titian, Tintoretto, Veronese: Rivals in Renaissance Venice, Renaissance Quarterly 64, no. 1 (2011): 187-89.  Shaw, Civic Christianity, 423.

^[19] Susanne Lepsius, review of Medieval Lucca and the Evolution of the Renaissance State, by M.E. Bratchel, Renaissance Quarterly 62, no. 3 (2009): 958-60.

^[20] Bruni, History, 2:239.

^[21] Bruni., 2:241.  Vasileios Syros, “Between Chimera and Charybdis: Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Views On the Political Organization of the Italian City-States,” Journal of Early Modern History 14, no. 5 (2010): 451-504.  This article offers a detailed examination of Byzantine and post-Byzantine comprehension of the political infrastructure of the Italian city-states and review of the constitutional framework of Italian cities such as Genoa, Venice, Florence, and Milan. 

^[22] Nicola Di Cosmo, “Black Sea Emporia and the Mongol Empire: A Reassessment of the Pax Mongolica,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 53, no. 12 (2010): 83-108.  “The term Pax Mongolica indicates a period of time (c. 1280-1360) during which Mongol domination seemingly guaranteed security on the Eurasian commercial routes. At this time the Italian maritime powers of Genoa and Venice established their commercial "emporia" on the Black Sea.”  Damir Grubisa, “Forms of Government in the Renaissance: Uniqueness of the Dubrovnik Model,” Politicka Misao: Croatian Political Science Review 47, no. 4 (2010): 161-78.  “The Venetian system of aristocratic republicanism was much more stable, but its social base was narrower and, ultimately, prior to its downfall, it transformed into a self-contained police system. The Dubrovnik model of political order was also a form of aristocratic republicanism, but its uniqueness lies in the fact that, unlike Venice or Genoa, it limited the authority and prerogatives of the head of state, in this case the rector, who guaranteed the stability and non-corruption of the system.” 

^[23] Eleanor Congdon, “Venetian and Aragonese/Catalan Relations: Protectionist Legislation in 1398-1404,” Medieval Encounters 9, no. 2 (2003): 214-35. “Presents a history of the foreign relations of Venetian of Italy and Aragonese/Catalan of Spain from 1398-1404. Enactment of protectionist legislation against foreign merchants; Motivation behind the enactment of the legislation; Reasons that existed for the Catalan/Aragonese hostility toward Italians in general and Venetians in specific.”

^[24] Bruni, History,  2:339.  John Gagne, review of Absolutism in Renaissance Milan: Plenitude of Power under the Visconti and the Sforza 1329-1535, Renaissance Quarterly 64, no. 1 (2011): 283-84.

^[25] Bruni, History, 3:61, 63.

^[26] Ibid.

^[27]  Ronald Witt, “Introduction: Hans Baron's Renaissance Humanism,” American Historical Review 101, no. 1 (1996): 107-10.  Witt assesses the influential studies of the Italian Renaissance from the Hans Baron's book `The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance.' 

^[28] Maya Corry, “The Alluring Beauty of a Leonardesque Ideal: Masculinity and Spirituality in Renaissance Milan,”Gender and History 25, no. 3 (2013): 565-89.  Monica Azzolini, “Anatomy of a Dispute: Leonardo, Pacioli and Scientific Courtly Entertainment in Renaissance Milan,” Early Science and Medicine 9, no. 2 (2004): 115-35.  Corry wrote, “Historians have recently paid increasing attention to the role of the disputation in Italian universities and humanist circles. By contrast, the role of disputations as forms of entertainment at fifteenth-century Italian courts has been somewhat overlooked. In this article, the Milanese ‘scientific duel’ (a courtly disputation) described in Luca Pacioli's De divina proportione is taken as a vantage point for the study of the dynamics of scientific patronage and social advancement as reflected in Renaissance courtly disputes.”   Jill Pederson, “Henrico Boscano's Isola Beata: New Evidence for the Academia Leonardi Vinci in Renaissance Milan,” Renaissance Studies 22, no. 4 (2008): 450-75.  Pederson concluded, “Historians have long debated the possibility of an academy in Quattrocento Milan centred around Leonardo da Vinci. Such an academy has been variously characterized based on textual and material sources. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the existence of this group has been vigorously denied in the scholarship on Leonardo. This article presents new information on the academy derived largely from the previously unpublished Renaissance manuscript, the Isola beata (c.1513). The text provides details of the academy's membership, as well as information that illuminates Leonardo's Milanese intellectual circle and helps to contextualize it in relation to other contemporary Italian Renaissance academies.” 

^[29] Bruni, History, 3:231.

^[30] Ibid., 3:235, 237.

^[31] Ibid., 3:249.

^[32] Ibid., 3:251.

^[33] Ibid., 3:273.

^[34] Ibid., 3:275.

^[35] Ibid.

^[36] Ibid., 3:277, 279.

^[37] Ibid.

^[38] Ibid., 3:283

^[39] Ibid., 3:291.

^[40] Ibid., 3:295, 297.

^[41] Ibid.

^[42] Ibid., 3:369.

^[43] Ibid.